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THE MARPART RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
The management, organization and governance of cross-border collaboration on emergency operations in 
the High North 
The key purpose of the Marpart research consortium is to increase understanding of the emergency 
management challenges in large-scale emergencies in the Arctic sea areas. We start with an  assessment  of 
the risk related to different types of maritime activity in the High North and the implications for the 
preparedness institutions in this region. We focus on cross-institutional and cross-country partnerships 
between preparedness institutions as well as private companies in the Arctic region. We elaborate on the 
operational crisis management of joint emergency operations including several parts of the preparedness 
system and resources from several countries. 
We emphasize the responsibility of the governments as to safety, security and environmental protection in 
the High North. Maritime preparedness is defined as the system for damage avoidance and reduction related 
to unexpected and unwanted incidents at sea. We elaborate on the need for enhanced measures to respond 
to composite challenges including search and rescue (SAR), oil spill recovery, firefighting and salvage, and 
actions against terror or other forms of destructive action. To increase both effectiveness and efficiency 
within the preparedness system, we are in need of management tools for coordination and control making 
optimal use of the joint resources of several institutions both within and between countries. 
In this project, we take as a starting point the commercial activity in the High North and the vulnerability 
related to human safety, environment, and physical installations/vessels. The commercial activity in the High 
North includes intra- / interregional transportation, search for and exploitation of petroleum and mineral 
resources, fisheries, and cruise tourism. Limited infrastructure, low temperatures with ice and icing, polar 
lows, and a vulnerable nature, challenge maritime operations in this region. 
MARPART project goals: 
• To increase understanding of future needs for joint operations within a preparedness system in the
High North including both search and rescue, oil spill recovery, firefighting and salvage, and actions
against terror or other forms of destructive action;
• To provide analytical concepts for studying coordination challenges in cross-border, multi-tasking
operations;
• To contribute with organizational concepts for inter-organizational partnership and management of
joint operations.
Cross-disciplinary, international research network consists of twenty professors/researchers and PhD-
students. 18 universities, police and naval academies and research institutes from eight countries (Norway, 
Russia, Iceland, Greenland, Denmark, Sweden are now part of the Marpart network. In addition universities 
from  Canada, USA, and Finland are part of an extended academic network called UArctic thematic network 
on Arctic Safety and Security.  The project partners have established Advisory Boards in each country 
including government preparedness authorities and industry representatives. 
2 
 
LIST OF AUTHORS 
 
Odd Jarl Borch Project Leader, Nord University 
Natalia Andreassen Nord University 
Nataly Marchenko The University Centre in Svalbard   
Valur Ingimundarson University of Iceland 
Halla Gunnarsdóttir University of Iceland 
Uffe Jakobsen University of Greenland 
Bolette Kern University of Greenland 
Iurii Iudin Murmansk State Technical University 
Sergey Petrov Murmansk State Technical University 
Sergey Markov Northern Arctic Federal University 
Svetlana Kuznetsova Northern Arctic Federal University 
  
 
 
   
 
  
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The “Maritime Activity and Risk Patterns in the High North” is the 2nd report conducted within the 
Work Package 1 “Maritime Activity and Risk” of the MARPART project. The MARPART project team 
would like to express their gratitude to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nordland 
County Administration for funding this project. In addition, we are thankful to Nord University and 
the partner universities.  
This report also relies upon the expertise of the different actors operating and analyzing the 
preparedness system in the participating countries. We are particularly thankful for input and 
support from: The Norwegian Coastal Administration; Resources and Competence Center for Safety 
and Preparedness in the Northern Region; High North Center at Nord University Business School; 
Salten Regional Police Department; Maritime Forum of Northern Norway; Joint Rescue Coordination 
Center Northern Norway; the Preparedness Department of the Nordland County Governor; 
Nordland County Administration; Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection; The Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway; Norwegian Coast Guard; Icelandic Coast Guard; the Environment Agency of 
Iceland; and the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management at the National 
Commissioner of the Icelandic Police; Maritime Rescue Coordination Center of Murmansk (Russia); 
Arkhangelsk Regional Rescue Service (Russia); Arkhangelsk Regional Agency for State Fire Service 
and Civil Protection (Russia). 
 
4 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report provides a discussion on dominating risk factors, risk types and the probability of 
unwanted incidents in the Arctic region. It also provides a coarse-grained evaluation of the potential 
consequences of different incidents in the northern sea areas of Russia, Norway, Greenland and 
Iceland. The risk assessments build upon statistics on vessel activity, case studies of real incidents, 
and expert evaluations of defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA). The evaluations in this 
study may serve as a platform for more detailed assessments, and as input for discussions on priority 
areas in respect to safety measures and emergency preparedness. In the Marpart project, the risk 
assessments have a special role as input into the analyses of emergency management capabilities, 
and the need for special governance efforts in cross-border cooperation.  
 
Russia: The traffic in Arctic Russia predominately consists of internal traffic between Arctic harbors 
and an increasing volume of transit traffic related to LNG and oil transport from terminals in 
northwestern Russia. Potential risk factors for the maritime activities in the Russian Arctic are the 
severe climatic conditions, the presence of sea ice, and technical risks related to vessels. A new 
pattern of activity is emerging as explorer cruise vessels are searching for new summer cruise routes 
in Arctic Russia.  
The risk assessment shows that the probability of accidents is low, but the consequences may be 
severe due to the presence of ice and other cold climate conditions, along with institutional factors 
such as remoteness and lack of preparedness infrastructure. The highest environmental risks concern 
the potential for fires on-board the vessels and collisions with ice. The highest potential for loss of 
life concerns the potential for fires, grounding and collisions with the ice for tourist ships and fishing 
vessels, along with the grounding and collision of cargo ships. The risks related to both grounding and 
collision with ice are significantly high in the winter months. However, the numbers of ships are 
limited, and the vessels have high ice class and/or are escorted by icebreakers. When it comes to the 
risk of violent actions, including terrorism, the probability is very low. The consequences may, 
however, be significant due to distances for medevac helicopters, police and special forces, with 
weather conditions such as fog hampering personnel transport. 
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In general, the skills level of the Russian participants in maritime activity complies with international 
standards. The fleet is being modernized, but there are still many old vessels, especially in the fishing 
fleet. The search and rescue fleet has received major state investments and is currently receiving 
several advanced rescue vessels of different types. To prepare for future challenges related to the 
possible growth of maritime activity in the Arctic, there is a need to further develop technologies, 
routines and rescue procedures to reduce the probability of accidents, and to improve personnel 
training as the first-line emergency response capacity. Special attention should be paid to the 
monitoring of staff health to prevent diseases at sea, safety management during works and 
navigation operations, and to improve the competence of crews and the personal responsibility of 
every seafarer. There is a need to test and develop emergency responses in teams for different types 
of incident including oil spills, collisions, groundings, fires, and even large-scale violent action and 
terrorism.  
 
Norway: The risk factors raising the likelihood of accidents in the Norwegian waters and sea areas 
around Svalbard include operations in narrow fjords and straits, poorly charted waters and 
remoteness, ice and icing in the Northern part of the Barents Sea and the Svalbard region, cold and 
unpredictable weather, and darkness in wintertime. Seasonal variations in conditions should be 
considered and special precautions taken according to area and time of year. Special risk assessments 
should be performed by the government and the ship owners operating in remote areas, and 
especially operations during the autumn and winter season. Lack of experience in these waters, 
vessel capacity and crew fatigue are risk-shaping factors. In the Svalbard region, these stressors are 
exacerbated and increase the likelihood of an accident. The limited capacities for mitigating the 
consequences of large-scale accidents in the outer islands, and in the Svalbard region in particular, 
imply that the consequences may be more severe for cruise ship passengers. Precautions within the 
industry and an increased focus on preparedness capacities in local and central government in the 
case of mass-rescue operations should be highlighted. 
Along the coast of mainland Norway, there are changes in the traffic pattern of vessels connected to 
offshore service transportation to and from oil and gas fields, along with the transport of petroleum 
and minerals and within the fisheries. The changes in activity pattern call for continuous assessments 
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of risk levels. The coastal sea traffic in Norway includes passenger and cargo transport dependent on 
the commercial activity level in the region. The predominant all-year traffic includes fishing vessels, 
general cargo ships and tankers. The frequency of SAR incidents is somewhat high within the fishing 
fleet due to its numbers, all-year operation in harsh weather, and operations close to the shore line. 
Moreover, they are operating close to the ice ridge in the Svalbard region. The cargo ships along the 
coast represent a special risk for oil spills due to groundings, and several severe incidents have 
occurred in the last few years. In the Svalbard region, larger cruise ships represent an environmental 
threat due to the large amount of fuel and especially heavy fuel oil on board. A ban on heavy fuel oil 
in the larger part of the Svalbard region reduces the risk of severe pollution. The fishing vessels in the 
region dominate by numbers, length and remoteness of operation. The statistics show that the 
majority of incidents take place in coastal sea areas close to the mainland of Northern Norway. 
However, the Svalbard region represents an area where incidents with fishing vessels are frequent, 
often resulting in the need for medevac and salvage.  
 
Iceland: The main vulnerabilities for maritime traffic in the sea around Iceland concern bad weather 
conditions, ships’ condition and equipment, the risk of fire, and risk of human error in decision-
making. The enormous Search and Rescue Region (SRR) of Iceland – which is 19 times the size of the 
country itself – presents challenges for the preparedness system. Higher temperatures resulting from 
climate change have, for example, led to increasing drift ice, which can cause severe accidents and 
human and environmental threats. With the lack of infrastructure, conditions for rescue operations 
are very difficult north of Iceland and in the Greenland Sea.  
The aging fleet of cargo vessels and tankers also poses a risk to the lives of crewmembers and rescuers 
and to the environment. While large cruise vessels have not grounded around Iceland, there have 
been incidents with smaller passenger boats. In the event of a ferry or cruise vessel accident, it could 
take days to transport people to land by helicopter and lifeboat. The risk of fire is present for all 
vessels and can pose a minor to moderate threat to the environment if it leads to an explosion or oil 
spill. While fishing vessels make up the largest part of maritime traffic in the sea around Iceland, the 
number of fatal accidents at sea has decreased drastically in the past decades. In regard to illegal 
activities, several drug smuggling attempts have been prevented in Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
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(EEZ). No incidents of terrorism have been reported in the Icelandic SRR, but such violence remains 
theoretically possible; primarily for passenger ships and – less likely – cargo vessels. Whale hunting 
boats, in contrast, might be a more likely target for sabotage.    
The Icelandic preparedness system and its response mechanisms do not face major problems. The 
Icelandic Coast Guard has, however, not been able to realize the full potential of its operational 
resources because it has been forced to curtail its monitoring functions due to budgetary restraints. 
While improved technology has simplified surveillance and rescue operations, the preparedness 
agencies have also been faced with new challenges, such as the increasing international nature of 
the shipping industry. Key governmental institutions still lack the legal power to take all measures 
considered necessary to prevent marine pollution and to ensure a full refund of the salvage 
operations. Finally, given the size of Iceland’s SRR and the country’s geographical distance, regional 
exercises and transnational operational cooperation are considered essential to improve responses 
to incidents.  
 
Greenland: The main factors challenging the current SAR service and pollution response in Greenland 
are the enormous sea and land area that is within Greenland’s area of responsibility. There are also 
challenges posed by the natural conditions with unpredictable weather, including frequent fog 
conditions, icebergs, and ice floes. Transport infrastructure is scarce, including a limited number of 
harbors. The helicopters and SAR resources are generally on the southwest and midwest coasts of 
Greenland and do not offer a fast and efficient emergency response in all areas of Greenland. 
The types of vessel most commonly in distress and in need of SAR operations are dinghies, smaller 
motor boats and fishing vessels. These types of vessel have a limited number of people on-board. 
 Since 2009, the number of cruises in Greenlandic waters has risen by 14%. More maritime traffic and 
activity in the Greenlandic waters can also be expected due to the effects of climate change, with 
longer sailing seasons and wider sailing opportunities. The Greenlandic emergency response 
therefore needs the resources and capacity to handle both smaller SAR operations that only require 
Greenlandic SAR preparedness and OSR resources, yet also larger operations that need assistance 
from Denmark, Svalbard and probably Canada or Iceland as well, depending on the position and the 
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size of a potential accident.  
A significant risk for human lives and the environment is predicted for tourist and cruise ships that 
sail in remote and isolated areas. In regard to cargo vessels, tankers, tugs, international transport, 
passenger transport, petroleum activities and research vessels, the risk of an accident in a position 
far from the nearest harbor, heliport, medical service or environmental response is estimated to be 
rare and the consequences to be moderate due to the frequent use of qualified and Greenlandic 
navigators. The estimated level of environmental risk for fishing vessels or smaller motor boats is 
lower since these types of vessel are carrying less oil or diesel compared to larger types of vessel. 
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INTRODUCTION             
BY NATALIA ANDREASSEN AND ODD JARL BORCH 
 
This report gives an overview of the risk patterns and types of maritime incidents in the High North 
that may appear threating life, environment and society values. The geographical focus of this 
overview is the sea area north of the Arctic Circle from the Kara Sea, along the Northwest coast of 
Russia, the Northern coast of Norway and around Svalbard, the Iceland sea area and the Greenland 
sea area. Developing commercial activities in the High North may increase the possibility of unwanted 
incidents. The vulnerability related to human safety and environment and a challenging context, calls 
for a continuous focus on safety issues and the capabilities of the maritime preparedness system.  
This report pays attention to the dominating risk factors that may lay the premises for the 
configuration of the emergency preparedness system and commercial activity in sea areas in the High 
North. The dominating risk factors are categorized into weather conditions, vessels type and size, 
human errors and decision-making, risk of fire, grounding, collision, oil spill, violence and terror.  
We build upon real accident experiences, experiences from exercises, experts perceived situations of 
hazards and statistics to examine the activities and the probability of incidents in different sea areas. 
Moreover, the consequences of potential damages and threats for human lives and environment are 
illuminated.  
First, we reveal the complexity of the High North context for maritime operations with all its risk 
factors, stressors, types and sizes of vessels. Then we analyze the frequency of incidents and 
significance of consequences, providing risk assessment matrixes for each sea region.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The assessment of risk is a challenging task especially when conditions are changing and we lack 
statistics for calculating probabilities. To illuminate the risk aspects in this study we present risk 
matrixes for the different sea areas. Our aim is to provide a coarse-grained picture of risk levels as a 
basis for further assessments and for a discussion on priority needs both as to precautions and safety 
efforts, and allocation of preparedness resources.  
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In the risk matrixes, we estimate 1) the frequency level of different types of incidents with different 
types of vessels and 2) the severity of consequences for a) human health and b) the environment. A 
certain element of expert evaluations on specific risk areas or defined situations of hazard and 
accident (DSHA) serve as basis for the matrix.  The estimates on consequences is based on case 
studies of real incidents in different parts of the world illuminating accidents with different types of 
vessels. We also base the analyses on results from exercises on mitigating the negative effects of 
accidents in Arctic waters.  
 Table 1 shows the categorizations used in this study. 
TABLE 1 POSSIBLE VARIATIONS OF ACCIDENTS, DEPENDING ON SHIP AND EVENT TYPES 
 Tourist/Cruise 
ship 
Cargo/tanker/petroleum 
Rigs/floaters  
Fishing 
Grounding T-G C-G F-G 
Damage due to collision 
(sea ice and other) 
T-I C-I F-I 
Fire  T-F C-F F-F 
Violence/terror T-V C-V F-V 
Other reasons T-O C-O F-O 
 
Grounding means the ship hits land or underwater rock. Damage due to collision includes both 
collision with other vessels/sea installations and sea ice. The category fire is about fire breaking out 
on board. The category violence means incidents of violent behavior towards persons and physical 
installations. The category other may include construction failure. 
Considering a risk as the amount of harm that can be expected to occur during a given time period 
due to a specific event, one can give indications on the level of risk. The risk is then the product of 
the probability that an accident happens multiplied by the severity of that harm. On a standard risk 
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matrix red cells indicate high risk, yellow – modern, green – low (Table 2). 
TABLE 2 A STANDARD RISK MATRIX 
5 – Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently      
3 – Occurs      
2 - Very Rare      
1 - Theoretically possible      
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
 
The risk matrix approach has been widely used for initial discussions on preparedness improvement, 
but has its limitations (Cox Jr, 2008). In most existing and available analyses, the risk level is usually 
given a coarse-grained categorization, because neither the probability nor the harm severity can be 
estimated with accuracy and precision. Moreover, some accident types such as violent action and 
terror have not happened in the High North waters so no statistics exist for calculation of probability, 
and we have limited understanding of possible consequences in this area. The main limitations of the 
existing risk assessments refer to the statistically assessed information about unknown quantitative 
risks that influences the ability of the matrix to provide priority guidelines for the different risk 
categories. In other words, categorizing frequency may require quantitative and qualitative 
information other than statistics, such as possible interactions among risks and countermeasures. 
Categorizing severity may require inherently subjective judgements about consequences and 
decisions how to aggregate together multiple small events and fewer severe events. Therefore, risk 
matrixes require subjective interpretation.  
The method of qualitative risk matrixes, which the MARPART research consortium applies, is based 
on both the existing statistics and estimates from experts from professional and research emergency 
preparedness institutions. For the risk assessment analysis, published analytical reports on maritime 
activity in the High North, facts published by different official sources in brochures and on websites 
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in Norway, Iceland, Russia and Greenland, and information from emergency preparedness 
institutions on relevant issues are used. In addition, risk assessments have been discussed with 
different specialists: industry specialists, government officials, researchers, navigators, and 
representatives from SAR-related authorities, organizations and academic institutions from Norway, 
Iceland, Denmark, Russia and Greenland. This includes the MARPART advisory board and project 
group meetings April 10, 2015, in Murmansk, Russia; the MARPART advisory board and project group 
meeting and conference February 25-26, 2016, in Reykjavik, Iceland; and the MARPART project 
conference 17-18 October 2016 on the Hurtigruten from Bodo, Norway. The theoretical 
underpinnings for the method were discussed during the 23rd International Conference on Port and 
Ocean Engineering under Arctic Conditions (POAC) held June 14-18, 2015 in Trondheim, Norway, and 
the 26th International Ocean and Polar Engineering (ISOPE) Conference held June 26-July 1, 2016 in 
Rhodes, Greece.  
For better reliability of the risk matrixes presented in this report, the following factors influencing 
categorization into the future should be taken into account in addition to the incident statistics:  
• the estimated level of future activity due to ice reduction and more usage of Arctic routes for 
transportation, 
• the density of maritime traffic, 
• the increased capacity of fishing vessels, 
•  the increased interest in cruise shipping in remote areas, 
• the increased size of the cruise ships entering Arctic waters,  
• the increased number of Arctic expedition cruise vessels contracted,  
• the number of oil and gas exploration licenses given in the High North, especially in Norway 
and Russia, 
• efforts from international organizations, governments and industries to increase safety in 
Arctic waters. 
 
As for categorization of consequences, firstly, in case of a lack of statistics in the High North region, 
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there is a need to learn from the largest SAR and oil spill response operations experienced. Secondly, 
there is a need to distinguish the risk of consequences for the environment and for people. 
Consequences will always depend on different factors and preparedness and resources availability is 
one of the most important ones. 
Summing up, the MARPART risk matrixes differ from similar risk assessments on the following 
dimensions:  
1. not only accident and spill accident frequency is calculated, but also the estimated activity in 
the High North sea areas; 
2. consequences are categorized into two probability areas – for people and for environment;  
3. consequences of large incidents are analyzed, even the cases without significant damage due 
to fortunately good conditions; 
4. we include real cases from non-Arctic areas to better assess the consequences of an accident.  
During the last decades, there have been significant increases in the emergency preparedness 
resources of the High North, among others with improved vessel and helicopter availability. Still the 
response time may be long and the capacity limited if major incidents occur. There is a need to 
analyze and estimate the activity level and the probability of incidents, the consequences of different 
incidents and assessing the risk engaged, in order to address risk levels and possible implications for 
the preparedness system in the High North. This may increase the opportunity to set the objectives, 
plans for necessary capacity, allocate resources and organize the preparedness system in an optimal 
way.  
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PART I  MARITIME ACTIVITY RISK PATTERNS AND TYPES OF UNWANTED INCIDENTS. 
THE RUSSIAN SEA AREAS IN THE NORTH-WEST ARCTIC   BY IURII I. UDIN, SERGEY O. 
PETROV, SERGEY V. MARKOV AND SVETLANA KUZNETSOVA      
 
Growing exploration of the Arctic has triggered a number of concerns about safety issues. To 
overcome the safety challenges we need to take into consideration existing risk factors, such as harsh 
climate conditions, weather, ice conditions, wave and wind patterns, bad visibility, and human 
influence of Arctic conditions on human physiology and psychology). In addition, technological 
aspects such as electronic communication challenges, material tiredness, accuracy of hydrographic 
and meteorological data are of importance.  
The development of Arctic oil and gas exploration, access to  other natural resources, fisheries, 
transportation traffic, commercial and touristic shipping in the Arctic seas require measures to ensure 
safety for people, environment and equipment alongside the maritime activities. Therefore, we need 
to assess the risk levels and probability of various type of incidents. This may lead to damage 
prevention, better planning, and to establish an adequate preparedness system. Due to the context 
complexity, the cross-institutional and international cooperation might facilitate the SAR and oil spill 
response operations and increase the efficiency of such an actions. 
The considerable distances and geographical vastness of the area require larger investments in 
emergency preparedness infrastructure along the coast to reduce response time and increase 
efficiency of rescue operations. In order to address this issue new rescue coordination centers are 
built on the Russian coast (in Murmansk, Archangelsk, etc), in connection with the new Arctic ports 
(Sabetta, etc.).  
In this report, we will focus on the Russian Seas areas of the North-West Arctic comprising the Barents 
Sea, the White Sea and the Kara Sea. In the following chapter, we present four topics, Dominating 
risk factors, Activity and probability of incidents, Consequences of accidents and, Risk assessment. 
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1 DOMINATING RISK FACTORS 
The Arctic Zone largely distinguishes itself from the rest of the Russian regions in terms of natural, 
economic and demographic setting. It is described as; extreme natural and climatic conditions with 
permanent ice cover and drift ice in the Arctic Ocean, patchy development of territorial economy, 
low population density (1-2 per 10 km²), remoteness from major industrial hubs, resource intensive 
by nature of industries and sustenance systems. These are dependent on the supply of fuel, food and 
essential goods by other Russian regions, vulnerability of natural ecosystems to man-made disasters 
and economic activity (Chupriyan, 2013). 
When assessing risk, an important condition is the precise definition of the relationship of factors 
affecting the development of the incident. All risk factors may either reduce or increase the risk of an 
emergency situation. Generally risk is defined as the product of the probability of an incident and the 
consequence of that incident (Risk = Probability x Consequence). Particularly the consequences of 
accidents - in terms of lives loss, environmental damage and/ or economical loss – may be more 
severe in the Arctic due to following conditions: 
• Remoteness, huge distances, and lack of infrastructure; 
• Darkness, which makes response more difficult; 
• Extreme temperatures and weather that makes response more challenging; 
• Sea ice complicating rescue operations and oil spill response; 
• Vulnerable marine and coastal environment; 
• Potentially long downtime of operations after accidents, due to only seasonal access for repair; 
• High public attention to activities in the Barents Sea, low public tolerance for accidents, with 
potential for loss of reputation for all parties involved (Barents 2020, 2013).  
The current state of social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation 
is characterized by the following risks and threats: 
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TABLE 3 RISKS AND THREATS OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC ZONE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
Social scope  Economic scope 
• negative demographic trend in most of the 
Arctic regions of the Russian Federation, the 
outflow of labor forces (especially skilled 
ones) to the southern regions of Russia and 
abroad; 
• lack of social services network 
correspondence to the type and dynamic of 
the land settlement including education, 
health, culture, physical education and sport;  
• critical state of housing and communal 
services, inadequate supply of clean drinking 
water;  
• lack of labor forces effective training, the 
imbalance between supply and demand of 
labor forces (shortage of workers and 
engineer professionals and a surplus of 
unneeded occupations, as well as people with 
no vocational training); 
• poor life quality of the indigenous peoples of 
the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian 
Federation living in the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation. 
• lack of Russian modern equipment and technologies for 
exploration and development of offshore hydrocarbon fields 
in the Arctic; 
• depreciation of fixed assets, in particular, of transport, 
industrial and energy infrastructure 
• underdevelopment of basic transport infrastructure, its 
marine and continental components, aging icebreaker fleet, 
lack of small aircraft;  
• high energy consumption and low efficiency by the 
extraction of natural resources, high costs of production in 
the northern areas without effective compensatory 
mechanism, low labor productivity; 
• imbalance in economic development between the individual 
arctic territories and regions, a significant gap between the 
leading and depressed areas in terms of development;  
• insufficient development of navigation and hydrographic 
and meteorological support of navigation;  
• lack of the energy system development, and the irrational 
structure of generating capacity, high cost of electricity 
generation and transportation;  
• lack of modern information and telecommunications 
infrastructure that permits the provision of services to the 
population and economic entities across the Arctic zone of 
the Russian Federation; 
• lack of a comprehensive permanent space monitoring of the 
Arctic territories and water areas, dependence on foreign 
sources of funds and information management of all 
activities in the Arctic (including interaction with aircraft and 
vessels). 
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In addition to social and economic risk factors, there are scarce technical resources and technological 
capabilities in the field of science and technology for research, development and use of the Arctic 
areas and resources. The technical stress factors include the variety of operating conditions affecting 
the safe navigation. This is the age of maintenance of the fleet and its compliance with the 
circumstances of shipping in polar conditions, the quality and quantity of hydrographic navigation 
information, the adequacy and timeliness of hydro-meteorological services, the implementation 
technology of shipping activities and operations, including emergency situations, including 
shipwrecks and oil spills. These factors are difficult to quantify. Many of them considered by the Polar 
code. 
Technical risks can especially be dangerous in extremely low temperatures. Most of the ships in this 
region have an age of more than 10 years. The fishing fleet is especially old and worn out (Shestakov, 
2015). Most vessels have more than 20 years maintenance period.  
 
FIGURE 1 RUSSIAN FISHING SHIPS 
   Source. K.Ivanova, 2015a 
Risk factors relevant for the Russian Atlantic sector from the Barents Sea to the Kara Sea include 
increased traffic through the Northern Sea Route, and emerging cruise ship traffic in the Russian part 
of the Barents Sea. Over the last 10 years, the coastal cargo transport has increased from 23% to 
31%. There is a reorientation of a considerable part of cargo vessels from large-tonnage vessels of 
unlimited sailing to smaller ships of river-sea navigation and coastal vessels. According to statistics, 
the majority of accidents and the largest accidents (i.e. self-propelled pontoon “Varnek”, M/V “Victor 
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Koryakin,” M/V “Sergey Kuznetsov” and the boat “Barents 1100") have occurred with such type of 
ships (Marchenko, 2015).  
The number of Arctic cruises is low, however, cruising is increasing into the harbors of Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk. It is relevant to note that the age of tourists may be an additional risk factor. Every third 
tourist is in the age of 70 to 90 years. Given the mobility of people of this age, it is necessary to ensure 
additional safety measures. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 AGE OF TOURISTS VISITING THE ARCHIPELAGO OF FRANZ JOSEF LAND IN 2014 AND 2015 
Source: http://www.rus-arc.ru 
 
For the Arctic Russia the main weather stressors that impact on emergency response are: permafrost 
melting; ice jams and ice motion; snowstorms; massive storms, strong winds and ice slick. The global 
warming that Russia is currently experiencing, like other Arctic countries, brings to the foreground 
the effects of shrinking permafrost, a process affecting a huge part of Russia. In High North areas, 
these effects may pose a huge danger to human health and safety. For the northern areas, the climate 
change will mean an increased risk of flooding, a phenomenon known to outrank all other natural 
disasters in terms of average annual damage. The area will most likely see more frequent occurrence 
of hazardous processes such as landslide (as an immediate result of permafrost melting); slow thawed 
soil creep (solifluction); and formation of depressions due to ice melting and removal by melt waters 
of soil (thermokarst). All these processes are likely to affect not only the regional economy but also 
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the entire emergency response system. They will also render the existing northern field aerodromes, 
which receive foodstuffs, mail, lubricants and other essential products used for rescue purposes that 
will be unsuitable for further use. The northern areas are facing the need to adjust their transport 
infrastructures to the impacts of climate change. The anthropogenic emergency-causing hazards 
include nuclear power plants and marine propulsion reactors; oil and gas pipeline ruptures; oil/gas 
spills and combustion; accidents in hydrocarbon production/metal processing/power 
generation/housing and utility sectors; shipwreck; rail/motor/aviation accidents.  
The passage along the Northern sea route include natural phenomena such as icebergs, stamukhas 
(ice ridges) and ice rivers (Marchenko et al., 2015). Calving from icebergs occurs periodically and per 
calving event a large iceberg, 13,9 particles between 5 and 20 m are produced. These pieces pose 
large threats to the ship operating nearby. Studies on bergy bits and growlers show an impact with 
ice pieces in a various range of ship speed, result in high impact loads on the vessel. Small ice pieces 
can cause extensive damages to the vessel if the vessel speed is not reduced (Høvik, 2015). Therefore, 
the icebreaker fleet becomes important for safety in these waters. Russian icebreakers assist cargo 
and passenger vessels and military ships when crossing the ice on the Northern Sea Route, and 
provide safe Arctic tourism. 
The human risk factors are related to the professional competence of crews of vessels and managers 
of fleet maintenance, the health of seafarers, responsible attitude of each crew member to their 
functions and duties. These factors increase their influence under the conditions. The crew must be 
prepared to shipping in these navigation conditions. The skill level of the Russian crews on the ships 
operating in Polar Waters complies with international standards adopted by IMO. All necessary 
measures of accident awareness are a basic part of maritime education. For example, in Murmansk 
State Technical University, Crews regularly take safety courses as a part of their pre-contract training 
and regular safety drills are carried out on board [www.mstu.edu.ru].  Nevertheless, the human factor 
prevails as the main reason for accidents (Davydenko, 2015). Among other human stressors that 
should be taken into consideration in the Arctic is the influence of Arctic conditions on humans – 
higher stress levels, longer periods without sunlight, atmospheric pressure, and how it influences safe 
operations at sea. This is an important and complex issue that requires further research (Chupriyan, 
2013).  
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The self-propelled pontoon “Varnek” sailed from Arkhangelsk on 21 July 2010 with 17 cargo 
containers and other goods amounting to 130 tons in total. It was lost in a storm on 23 July. It was 
assumed that the captain looked for refuge from the storm to the North of Kanin Nos Peninsula. 
The ship owner tried to search for the “Varnek” himself, and only 61 hours after the disappearance 
of the “Varnek” he asked for help from the EMERCOM of Russia. In the second half of the same 
day, the rescue helicopter discovered the loss of a ship near the island of Korga. Nine people died 
(Khimanych, 2010). 
Data published by ship owners and crewing agencies provided evidence that the most effective age 
of seafarers is in between 30 and 50 years of life. The navigators and marine engineers of this age 
already have enough experience on ships. They have a good health and they are in demand on the 
labor market. Generally, the vacant positions exceed the number of the specialists. Normally, sailors 
prefer ships that are just built up to 5 years of technical operation, or as a second preference - from 
5 to 15 years. Ordinary positions on these ships take novice sailors aged from 20 to 30 years. But, the 
number of these is not large. On vessels from 15 to 25 years of operation, personnel is 25 years and 
older, formed by young seafarers from 20 to 30 years, and people over 50 years old. 
Specialists these age categories are at risk. Young seafarers due to lack of experience, and more 
experienced sailors over the age of 50 due to possible professional burnout or weaker health. These 
points are overlaid with the technical factors associated with the operation of ships older than 25 
years.  
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FIGURE 3 CHART OF CORRELATION OF AGE OF CREW MEMBERS TO THE PERIOD OF TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION OF THE VESSEL 
 
The institutional risk factors are ones of the most important influencing risk assessment. 
Quantification extremely difficult. Its implementation is only possible on the basis of long statistical 
observations. From the institutional organization directly depends on the strategy and efficiency in 
decision making. Due to the significance of distances in the Arctic and the aggressiveness of the 
external environment, the time of arrival of rescue and its quality has a decisive importance in saving 
human lives and preserving the environment. 
Going east, the distances to nearest adequate infrastructure increases. Ensuring the safety of 
maritime activities is difficult due to the considerable distances to harbors, airports and hospitals, as 
well as difficult ice conditions. Limited infrastructure in this region makes it difficult to face accidents 
with the necessary resources, also included within the preparedness system (Marchenko et al., 2015). 
An impact on the environment most likely exceeds the sustainable limits in certain regions of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, especially in the coastal regions [Development strategy of the 
Arctic zone]. Therefore it is necessary to highlight also the impact on the environment that may bring 
restricting laws and regulation.  
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2 ACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS 
The Russian Arctic has the thickest 'layer' of industrial activity; and the scale of industrial activity here 
is larger than that of the other Arctic states. Here we have the most urbanized Arctic community in 
the world, the maximum amount of monoprofile cities and settlements, and powerful resource sector 
of the Arctic economy (Pelyasov, 2013). The Russian Arctic is therefore vulnerable to accidents. An 
accident can be defined as an undesirable event that results in damage to humans, assets and/or 
environment. The risk level in the maritime area is a result of a number of factors relating to the 
environmental conditions maritime activities are subjected to and the way the work processes are 
organized (Kristiansen, 2013). Statistical studies of maritime accidents and unfortunate events in ice-
covered areas in 1995-2011 showed a general lack of information from the area under the jurisdiction 
of the Russian Federation (Pastusiak, 2014). So far, there is no detailed database of accidents 
happened in the Russian part of the Arctic.  
In this report we use data provided by the Murmansk Maritime Rescue Coordination Center 
(Murmansk MRCC) within the last three years. In total, according to the statistical data of EMERCOM, 
anthropogenic emergency situations show an increase in the Arctic zone, with accidents occurring, 
in different time periods, in/on: 
• transport sector – 25-32%; 
• process equipment (fires/explosions) – 18-39%; 
• residential and administrative buildings (collapse/fire) – 21-39%; 
• plants (toxicant emissions) – 8-12%; 
• public utilities and sustenance systems – 7-15%; 
• pipelines – 4-8% (Chupriyan, 2013).   
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
FIGURE 4 SAR RESOURCES IN THE ARCTIC ZONE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Source: http://www.mintrans.ru 
 
Maritime activities in the Arctic can be divided into Maritime transport, cruise shipping, fishing, 
continental shelf operations including rig operations, supply services, pipeline laying, underwater 
activities, science, survey and other activities. These activities are discussed in the following section.  
MARITIME TRANSPORT  
There was a dramatic decline in harbor activity after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some harbors have 
lost their position entirely and have very limited traffic today. Then there have been a decade of slight 
increase in cargo volume, among others related to mining and oil and gas transport. Transit cargo 
shipping through the North Eastern Passage or the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has increased more 
than 10 times from 0.11 million tons (4 passages) in 2010 to 1.36 million tons (71 passages) in 2013. 
However, after four years of increased use of the Northern Sea Route by vessels going in transit 
between Europe and Asia, a steep downturn happened in 2014. The amount of cargo transported in 
transit dropped by 77 % compared to 2013. According to the Head of the Northern Sea Route 
Administration Aleksander Olshevskiy, the negative development had nothing to do with the current 
political situation. He referred to two possible reasons for the downfall in cargo transport: EvroKhim, 
who used to transport bulk cargo from Murmansk from the Kovdor Mining Company, was not able 
to agree on prices with its customers and freighters and had therefor shipped 200,000 tons less than 
usual. The other reason was that Novatek was no longer shipping out gas condensate from Vitino on 
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the Kola Peninsula but from Ust-Luga outside St. Petersburg (BarentsObserver, 2014). 
 
TABLE 4  CARGO TRANSPORTATION BY THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE, INCLUDING TRANSIT (THOUSAND TONS) 
Year  2013 2014 Beginning of December 2015 
Transit  1,176 274 39 
Total  3,914 3,982 5,152 
Source: Monko, 2015 
The advantage of connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific ocean with a 24% distance reduction (for 
Shanghai–Rotterdam) is offset by many factors including harsher weather and free-floating sea ice, 
requiring more expensive ship construction, and winterization investments. Remoteness, lack of 
broadband communications, and limited SAR capabilities increase the risk of Arctic operations. 
Shallow waters limit vessel size, and ice movements lead to unpredictability of the ships’ arrival time 
(Keil and Raspotnik, 2014). The statistical data NSR in 2015 have proved the tendency of decreasing 
transit transport within via the Northern Sea Route.  
The shipping between Russian ports within the NSR is, however, increasing. Cargo to and from 
Russian ports along NSR has gone up from 2.8 million tons in 2013 to 3.7 million tons in 2014, and 
4.5 million tons in 2015. Most of this increase comes as a result of large oil and gas developments in 
the Russian Arctic, like the huge Yamal LNG project, and the Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora 
Sea (BarentsObserver, 2015). Throughput of the sea port of Varandey for 10 months in 2015 was 5.5 
million tons, indicating a growth of 11.4% (TrLog, 2015). 
There are some trends indicating further increase of shipping. The project of the Murmansk transport 
hub construction was included in the state program "Modernization of transport system of Russia". 
The project objectives are following: the creation of a transport infrastructure on the Western shore 
of the Kola Bay including the construction of the railway line Vikhodnoi – Lavna, the creation of coal 
and oil terminals, the development of the existing infrastructure on the Eastern shore of the Kola Bay 
(Tukavin, 2015). 
Mezhregiontruboprovodstroy JSC at commercial port of Arkhangelsk also installs new areas for the 
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transshipment of multipurpose cargo by sea. New terminal is being built on the east coast of the river 
of Northern Dvina. This cargo port area is specifically designed to provide oil and gas projects 
implemented in the Arctic (Kuzmina, 2015). 
On the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago the nuclear submarine (NPS) K-27 was scuttled in 1981. The 
presence of the reactors and radioactive nuclear fuel remnants may lead to the continued heating of 
the inner cavities of the submarine and as a consequence to constant heat flow from its surface which 
is an obvious danger including risks associated with plans to refloat and transport the submarine for 
the further dismantlement (Dmitrievsiy et al., 2015). In November 2015, Russia’s national operator 
for radioactive waste management received approval from the Arkhangelsk Regional Legislative 
Assembly to allow subsurface storage of low- and medium level nuclear waste beneath the 
permafrost of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the Russian Arctic. Thereafter, the risks related to 
the transport of nuclear waste on vessels may occur in the Russian part of Arctic (Bellona, 2015). 
From 1900 to 1985, there were reported 7 forced overwinterings, 14 force drifts with ice, 21 
shipwrecks, and 3 damages by ice in the Kara Sea. Compared to Arctic Eastern Seas, the Kara Sea had 
the largest number of accidents, partly due to the relatively high intensity of navigation and not 
because it sustained the worst ice conditions. After 1990, there were quite a few events in Russian 
Arctic because ice navigation practically ceased except for the Murmansk-Dudinka route. Information 
about the current state of affairs in the Russian Arctic in extremely scare (Marchenko, 2011).   
According to the Safety and Shipping review 2016, there has been an increase in the maritime 
accidents in the Arctic area as a result of the increased activity during the recent years (Alianz Global 
Corp.&Speciality, 2016).  
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TABLE 5 ACCIDENT STATISTICS IN THE ARCTIC 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Machinery 
damage/failure 
2 3 5 13 14 16 12 13 20 27 125 
Wrecked/stranded 1 4 10 11 14 9 9 8 10 14 90 
Miscellaneous   5 1 4 4 2 6 5 5 32 
Fire/explosions   3 1 2 6 6 1 4 2 25 
Collision    1 4 10 4 4 2  25 
Contact (eg harbor 
wall) 
  1 1 1 3 1 3 6 4 20 
Hull damage  1 3 1 6 2 2 1 2 1 19 
Foundered   1 1 2  3 1 1 2 11 
Total 3 8 28 30 47 50 39 37 50 55 347 
Source: Hoevic, 2015 
In 2014, there were 55 shipping casualties in the Arctic, compared to only 3 a decade ago. Between 
2005 and 2014, there were reported 31 total losses in the Russian Arctic and Bering Sea.  
 As illustrated in the figure, machinery damage/failure is the principal cause of the casualties; causing 
36% on the incidents, 9% of the casualties are due to hull damages and 6% due to contact. The 
accidents statistics does not state how many of the contact casualties that are caused by contact ice, 
but implies that several of the casualties are related to contact with the harbor wall (Hoevic, 2015).  
According to the statistics of the Murmansk Maritime Rescue Coordination Center, there were 40 
accidents in its responsibility area within the period from 2013 until November 2015. 43% of these 
accidents were caused by machinery damage/failure. As Table 6 demonstrates, the number of 
incidents has increased in 2015. That can be explained mostly by the increased maritime traffic. 
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TABLE 6 ACCIDENT STATISTICS IN THE RESPONSIBILITY AREA OF THE MURMANSK MARITIME RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER 
  2013 2014 2015 
Machinery damage/failure 8 7 7 
Wrecked / stranded   1 
Fire    2 
Medical assistance  4 2 7 
A crew member overboard  1 1 
In total  12 10 18 
 
 
   
FISHING  
The total catch of fish and seafood products in 2015 is 262,507 tons, which is an increase of 42,729 
tons compared to the last year (56% of the Murmansk region). The fishing fleet consists of more than 
2.5 thousand small and larger ships. In 2014, there were 46 emergency cases involving fishery fleet 
of the Russian federation. In total, the accident rate increased by 8% (MAIB, 2015).  
According to the statistics of the Murmansk MRCC, the most emergency calls were received from 
fishing vessels: 7 out of 10 in 2014 and 16 out of 18 within November 2015. In the most cases, the 
fishing vessels needed assistance in towing due to machinery damage / failure. In 2015, there were 
reported two fires onboard of fishing vessels, and one vessel was stranded. Fortunately, these 
accidents did not cause severe consequences.  
Incidents with fishing boats are frequent in the area. They produce the same problems/consequences 
mentioned above, but on a smaller scale. This type of accident has a relatively high probability of 
occurring, though. There were not registered large accidents with human losses in the western part 
of the Arctic but a severe capsizing in the Okhotsk sea in 2015 shows the challenges of SAR operations 
in Arctic waters. 
The tragic event with the refrigerator trawler “Far East” happened in April 2015 in the Sea of 
Okhotsk shows all the difficulties the emergency services face by maritime accidents in low 
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temperature conditions. The wrecked vessel did not get time to send distress signals. In some 
minutes all the crew of 132 seamen came to icy water. 26 fishing vessels were close by the 
emergency site but only 63 seamen were rescued. 
 
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITY 
Russia is the second largest natural gas producer and the third largest oil producer in the world. The 
oil and gas receipts constitute approximately 52% of the federal budget and are about 70% of the 
Russian exports (according to 2012 statistics of PFC Energy) EIA (2015). The oil and gas industry is 
situated mainly within five oil and gas producing regions: Western Siberia (about 70% of all Russian 
oil production), Volga-Urals region (25%), Timan-Pechora region (6%), North Caucasian and Far East 
regions. The production of oil is distributed among the regions as following (at 2012, thsd. BPD): 
Western Siberia - 6,422; Urals-Volga - 2,312; Krasnoyarsk – 368; Sakhalin – 283; Komi Republic – 259; 
Arkhangelsk – 249; Irkutsk – 201; Yakutiya – 133; North Caucasus – 64; Kaliningrad – 26.  
During the last few years, there has been an increase in offshore exploration activity. Russia possesses 
vast hydrocarbon resources in the North Shelf and the Arctic shore. In the Arctic Shelf Russia has 
assessed resources up to 100 bln. tn. of oil equivalent (Giles, 2014).  
The Russian petroleum industry moves offshore towards the shelf. Ferries and combined transport-
passenger vessels deliver supplies and personnel to the drilling platform Prirazlomnaya and other 
Arctic sites from the coastal regions. Besides, there has been an increase in offshore oil and gas 
exploration activity. As an example, an expedition in the Kara Sea included 10-15 vessels with crews 
of several hundred people. The logistics in this area is complicated, hampered by the lack of harbors 
and other infrastructure such as harbors and airports. There is also a limited transport infrastructure 
in many coastal communities of the White Sea and Barents Sea. Ships perform regular passenger 
transportation and freight, but the hydro-meteorological information is not always sufficient. The 
navigators are forced to rely on their experience and good skills. 
Rosneft and Eni plans to operate on both the Norwegian side of the Norwegian-Russian border in the 
Barents Sea (Intsok, 2014). Rosneft and Statoil have plans for a joint venture in the Perseyevsky field 
in the northern part of the Barents Sea. They will perform seismic activities in 2016-2018 and plan 
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drilling in 2020. The timing of the development of exploration, exploitation and transport will very 
much depend on the international prices of oil and gas and the development in political relations. 
The fields that have been under construction in Russia will, however, represent a significant increase 
in shipping activity.  
The number of accidents related to oil and gas industry in the Arctic and subarctic areas are quite 
small. Only the Kolskaya Rig accident (2011) resulted in the loss of human lives as the rig capsized 
due to stability failure and rough weather. The 'Kolskaya' jack-up rig, operated by Russian offshore 
exploration company Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka (AMNGR), capsizes while being towed in a storm, 
some 200 kilometers (125 miles) off the coast of Sakhalin island. The rig had 67 crew aboard of whom 
14 were rescued [Reuters, December 18, 2011]. A similar accident happened on November 7th, 2014: 
the jack-up rig “Saturn” was damaged by the storm while being towed to Murmansk after completing 
construction works on a well in Pechora sea.. The crew was partially evacuated and towing had been 
suspended. The press service of the company assures “there were no incidents or disasters at the 
jack-up rig” (BarentsObserver, March 10, 2014). 
The Usinsk accident (1994) was of type pipeline leak and resulted in a large oil spill. The Nefterudovoz-
57 ship collision accident (2003) also had environmental related consequences (Basharat, 2012). The 
accident on the Molikpak rig in the Sakhalin shelf within the Sakhalin-2 project (2009) resulted in 165 
l oil product spill on the ice near the rig. The oil spill response was conducted effectively and there 
weren’t any environmental related consequences in this case (Shurikhina, 2013).  
Other threats the oil offshore activities cause are environmental conflicts. The so-called Sunrise case 
happened on the 18th of September 2013, when six Greenpeace activists approached the 
Prirazlomnaya platform from the Arctic Sunrise, using inflatable boats. Two of them were arrested by 
the border guards of Russian Federal Security Service’s Office in Murmansk Region and delivered on 
board the Ladoga search and rescue vessel. In 19 September, the helicopter-borne border guards of 
the Russian Federal Security Service seized “the Arctic Sunrise” in the exclusive economic zone of the 
RF to convoy it to Murmansk (RIA novosti, 2013). 
The most dangerous and discussed events possible in the region are ships accidents resulting oil spills. 
Fortunately, there have not been any large marine oil spills in the Arctic, so there is not much 
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experience to learn from. It is known that volumes of oil spills by shipping is 23-26 times bigger than 
by oil production (Bogoyavlinsky, 2014). If oil and gas traffic in the Arctic increases, there is a higher 
risk for collisions of vessels and the number of vessels running aground. The Marine Rescue Service 
of Rosmorrechflot provides a full range of services to address oil spills in Russia 
(http://morspas.com/en/services/osr).  
The probability of such events will grow along with increasing activity level and will rise the concern 
for search and rescue capacities, and for security issues. Considering maritime activity related to the 
oil and gas activity, the probability of incidents increases during the following technological stages: 
• delivery of crews and personnel to the drilling platforms and shipping terminals by air 
transport; 
• connection and disconnection of cargo flexible pipeline during the operation of loading oil 
into tankers; 
• destruction of the integrity of subsea pipeline cargo connecting the coastal tanks with 
Varandey shipping terminal (Monko, 2015). 
CRUISE SHIPPING 
Russian companies have long time experience with cruises to the North Pole on "Rosatomflot" 
icebreakers. Promising cruises to the North Pole include visits to Svalbard and along the NSR, for 
example, the route "Murmansk - Svalbard - Franz Josef Land - Severnaya Zemlya and Bolshevik Island 
- Wrangel Island" and other marine tourism and recreation routes. There are plans for the extension 
of the route of the Norwegian company Hurtigruten cruises to the ports of Murmansk and 
Archangelsk and to the Solovetsky islands (rus-arc.ru).  
The interest for Arctic tourism is growing. Cruise vessels touched at the Arkhangelsk region ports 23 
times in 2015. During the recent years, there have been around 10 vessels on routes every summer. 
According to the governor of the Arkhangelsk region, Igor Orlov, there has been a 70% increase of 
tourists visited Franz Josef Land and Novya Zemlya in 2015 compared to 2014 (Figure 4). The reason 
for such an increase of cruises is the opening of the maritime frontier control office in Arkhangelsk 
(Dvinainform, 2015). Besides, direct cruises Svalbard - Franz Josef Land are launched also in 2015. In 
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addition, there is some traffic involving private yachts and sailboats.  
There is a lot of uncertainty about the tourist traffic in the Russian Arctic area. Larger cruise vessels 
in the remote part of the Northern Sea Route and explorer cruises close to ice and in areas with 
limited infrastructure may increase the risk. The tourist industry would like to explore areas in the 
Northern regions and find ways where few have travelled. This may imply more traffic in the most 
Northern parts of Russia north of the Wrangel and New Sibirian Islands, Severnaya Zemlya and 
Novaya Zemlya and up Franz Josefs land as close to ice areas as possible.  
During recent years, there were not reported severe incidents involving cruise ships. According to 
the statistics of the Murmansk MRCC, two yachts had machinery failure in 2013 and they were towed 
to Murmansk.   
 
FIGURE 5 THE NUMBER OF VESSELS VISITED ARCHIPELAGO FRANZ JOSEF LAND IN 2014 AND 2015 
Source: http://www.rus-arc.ru 
 
 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 
The Northern fleet has its base on surface ship at Severomorsk and for submarines at Vidyayevo, 
Gadzhiyevo, and Polyarny. It has 8 operational SSBN submarines and 18 general-purpose nuclear-
powered submarines. It has fairly modern and well-maintained surface warships, including the 
aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, one nuclear cruiser Pyotr Veliky, and six destroyers. Russia has 
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opened new military bases at the New Sibirian Island and Franz Josef land. 
Research expeditions also have increased in number in the Western part of the Russian Arctic. In 
2015, the annual expedition "Arctic Floating University - 2015", the research project of the Northern 
Arctic Federal University,  passed 3351.5 nautical miles (6208, 988 km) in the White, Barents, Pechora 
and Kara Seas. Total travel time was 20 days and eight hours. The ship went through three storms 
that required changing the itinerary of the expedition (UArctic, 2015).  
Kara-Winter-2015, scientific-exploratory expedition, organized by the oil company Rosneft with the 
support of the Arctic Research and Design Center and FSBI Arctic and Antarctic research institute has 
become the largest Arctic expedition in the world in recent 20 years by the scope and the structure 
of works. Explorations lasted for ten weeks and involved the Yamal atomic icebreaker, which went 
from the Barents Sea up to the East Siberian Sea almost through all the shore of the Russian Arctic. 
The expedition included complex of meteorological, oceanographic, ice patrol, glaciological and 
biological observations (Rosneft website, 2015).  
There haven’t been reported any large research expedition accidents within last years. According the 
statistics of the Murmansk MRCC in 2013, a fishery research vessel was towed to Murmansk due to 
machinery failure.  
Russia is today the most experienced nation with respect to ship operation in ice and low 
temperatures. In addition to the basic rules there are several guidelines covering practical operations 
(Barents 2020, 2013). There are already stringent measures in place to insure low probability of 
accidents: such as vessels and personnel training requirements, compliance with international and 
national codes, etc.  
According to the development strategy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and national 
security for the period up to 2020, the establishment of integrated security system for the protection 
of territory, population and critical facilities of the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone from natural and 
man-made emergency situations shall be provided. This includes the development and 
implementation of projects in the exploration and developments on the Arctic continental shelf and 
coastal areas, and other infrastructure projects in order to improve the system of state management 
of social and economic development. The organizational structure of management and shipping 
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safety must be improved; integrated safety shipping system must be created in the Russian part of 
the Arctic.  
To achieve these goals, 10 maritime rescue centers will be located in:  
• Dudinka 
• Murmansk 
• Arkhangelsk 
• Naryan-Mar 
• Vorkuta 
• Nadym 
•  Tiksi 
• Pevek 
• Provideniya 
•  Anadyr  
(RiaNovosti, June 1, 2015): 
The Russian Air Force in October 2013 re-opened the Temp airfield on the Kotelny Island, which is 
planned to be the first in a chain of similar bases all along the Northern coast of Russia 
(BarentsObserver, 2013). 
One of the main challenges for a more effective use of the sea route is the need for new icebreakers. 
The president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said in 2010, Russia planned to build at least 
three nuclear icebreakers of the new generation in the period from 2012 to 2020. It should be noted 
the icebreakers and ice class rescue vessels are and will also act as “floating” SAR and oil spill response 
units. Within the Federal Target Programme “Russian Transport System Development in 2010–2020”, 
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40 rescue vessels are planned to build. Besides, the RF Marine Activities Strategy until 2030 stipulates 
the creation of 70 rescue vessels for the Defense Ministry, EMERCOM, and Transport Ministry.  
The federal program "Development of civil marine engineering" in 2009 - 2016 provides the 
development, design and construction of a significant number of civil courts (DGRF№103). Many of 
them have already been commissioned. These include vessels of the auxiliary fleet, river passenger, 
crew boat, marine salvage vessels and tugs, icebreakers, including line services and nuclear, as well 
as many others. From 2000 to 2015 the Russian fleet increased by more than 300 sea and river vessels 
of auxiliary and technical purposes (Ivanova, 2015b). First of all, the program is being implemented 
in the interests of the federal system of civil maritime activities. Marine and river transport vessels of 
small tonnage and non-propelled fleet (barges and barge-towing trains) are not included in the 
program but this fleet transfers a large part of multipurpose cargoes. 
TABLE 7 NEW BUILD SHIPS FOR AUXILIARY AND TECHNICAL PURPOSES 
Completed Under construction 
38 rescuer, diving ship and firefighting 
vessels 
8 Icebreakers 
15 ships for rescue service 159 tugs 4 ship-fueler 
15 ship-fueler 10 pilot boats 
3 marine and river icebreakers 3 support vessel for the service of lighthouse and navigation 
equipment 
Source: (K.Ivanova, 2015b) 
 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT INCIDENTS 
This section discusses consequences of five types of maritime accidents:  
• Grounding that means that the ship hits land or underwater rock. Areas where most of the 
groundings take place are port approach areas, straits, channels, roadstead areas (especially 
in the Arctic).  
• Damage due to collision includes both collision with other vessels/sea installations and sea 
ice. 
• Fire breaking out on board.  
38 
 
• Violence - incidents of violent behavior towards persons and physical installations.  
• Other types of accidents, for example construction failure. 
GROUNDING 
The main consequences of grounding in the Arctic are damage to the ship’s constructions and cargo, 
oil spills, crew injuries, and ship owner’s financial losses. Higher requirements to vessel's technical 
quality, increased demands for coastal sailing certificates, pilot services and the vessel traffic control 
system have reduced the frequency of grounding. Even though grounding of cargo vessels and cruise 
ship may occur rarely, it may have severe consequences for the environment, not the least because 
of the heavy fuel oil used and because of vulnerability of coastline as to wildlife, fisheries, fish farming, 
tourist and leisure activities. The oil spill recovery may also be severely hampered by bad weather, 
ice and snow.  
We can see some of these consequences in the case with the Russian dry cargo vessel Viktor Koryakin.  
The Russian dry cargo vessel Viktor Koryakin with crew of 12 and cargo of timber was pushed 
ashore by gale force winds while anchored by the coast of the Rybachiy Peninsula in the Barents 
Sea on December 18, 2007. As no helicopters was available at the Russian side, the Joint rescue 
Coordination Center (JRCC) Northern Norway received a call that a Russian cargo vessel was in 
trouble outside the Rybachiy Peninsula. They scrambled the nearest Sea King rescue helicopter and 
after three hours, the Sea King helicopter from Banak (Norway) had rescued all the twelve sailors 
from the vessel. During the dramatic operation, the vessel broke in two. Fortunately, no large oil 
spill occurred (BarentsObserver, 2010). 
DAMAGE DUE TO COLLISION 
In general, collisions are rare in the Arctic, since the traffic density is much lower. However, once they 
happen they have very serious consequences, depending of type of vessels taking part in the collision 
and may include crew injuries or even fatalities, oil spills, other types of environmental pollution, 
damage to the ship’s constructions and cargo, and of course ship owner’s financial losses. 
Due to heavy ice conditions severe damage to the ship may occur as shown in the case with MV Nina 
Sagadak. 
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The MV "Nina Sagaydak" sank October 9, 1983 in Long Strait. In early October, the ship was in a 
caravan under the wiring icebreakers "Leningrad" and "Captain Sorokin". The pressure of the ice 
increased dramatically due to a strengthening North-westerly wind. The ship was jammed by big, 
old drift-ice, including the propeller and rudder. With the motion of the ice, the wheel arbitrarily 
shifted from side to side up to 90 degrees. As a result, the limiters were broken off the rudder 
stock. The icebreakers that came to help the vessel was not aware of the movements of the ice 
and the general drift to the Southeast with the pressure of the ice on the ship. 
Between the ships in the caravan there formed a cushion of compressed ice.  The ship "Kamensk-
Uralskiy", lost control in the drift, stern piled into the MV "Nina Sagaydak". The list of "Nina 
Sagaydak" reached 13 degrees. The position was complicated when the ship "Kamensk-Uralskiy" 
side piled into the tanker "Urengoy". At one time, three vessels drifted together.  
The ice ridge rose above the main deck of the vessel "Nina Sagaydak". On 8 October the crew 
experienced deformation of the port side of the ship with cracks in the hull. The water began to 
leak into the engine room. The list reached 30 degrees to starboard. The crew left the ship by 
helicopter and was delivered to the icebreaker, The deck entered the water, and the ship sank on 
October 9 (Tsoy, 2009). 
 
In September 2013, the 138 m long tanker Nordvik was struck by an ice floe and suffered water 
ingress in one of the ballast tanks when sailing in the Kara Sea. The vessel, which was loaded with 
diesel, an Ice 1 class tanker, was permitted to sail in the Northern Sea Route in light ice condition. 
The conditions were regarded as medium in the period of the accident. The Federal agency for sea 
and river transport reported that Nordvik acted irresponsibly when entering the waters with medium 
ice conditions without having assistance of an icebreaker. On the other hand, experienced captains 
stated that it was possible to unintentionally end up in an area with medium ice conditions, as the 
conditions change rapidly. The accident revealed that ship owners do not always comply with the flag 
state rules, in this case Northern Sea Route Administration, when operating in their jurisdiction.  
Fortunately, the accidents occurred without any loss of life or significant oil spill. These accidents 
demonstrate that even though the vessels are designed to operate in light ice condition, an impact 
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casualty with drifting ice can result in severe damages to the hull. It can be difficult to differentiate a 
large ice floe from a bergy bit (Basharat, 2012).  
FIRE ON BOARD 
Fire on board is a very serious threat, especially in the Arctic. The main consequences of fire are 
injuries and loss of human lives, ship owner’s financial losses, damage to the ship’s constructions and 
cargo and environmental pollution. 
The nuclear Ice breaker ”Vaigach” 
At night from 14th to 15th December 2011 there was a fire onboard Russian nuclear icebreaker 
Vaigach, on route from Dudinka to Murmansk. The fire started from second engineer’s cabin. There 
was a lot of smoke, it quickly spread to all cabins of the ship’s superstructure, and there was several 
explosions on various levels. Thanks to proper professional actions of the captain and the crew, the 
fire was quickly extinguished.    
The passenger vessel "Alushta" 
In February 2010, a fire broke out onboard the passenger vessel "Alushta" repaired at the shipyard 
"Krasnaya Kuznitsa" in Arkhangelsk. The fire started at 10.45 am by a hard frost outside. Onboard 
the ship there were 30 workers, four of them got burned and toxic poisoning and were taken to 
hospital. Others were evacuated successfully and were not injured. By 2 pm, the ship was full in 
fire. Firefighting was complicated because of the vessel construction with many passenger cabins 
and high combustion temperature. As a result, the ship was completely burned out. The loss of this 
vessel caused very significant damage to the tourism industry and transport supply in the 
Arkhangelsk region (Rivportal, 2010).  
These examples show how dangerous can be fires on ships. Statistics demonstrate that in the sea the 
fire rate is lower than during vessels repairmen or construction. However, in the case of fire in the 
open sea, the consequences can be very dramatic (MAIB, 2015). 
VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM ACTIONS 
Violence normally includes attacks on vessels, either as piracy or terrorism. Fortunately, there have 
never been any cases of piracy, terrorism or high-jacking in the Russian Arctic. Nevertheless, the 
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attack by the international activists of Greenpeace on the Prirazlomnaya platform at 04:00 a.m. on 
the 18th of September 2013 was regarded by the authorities of the Russian Federation as a pirate 
attack. The authorities explained that this act might cause injuries of people and the construction 
damage. Russian border guards seized the Greenpeace icebreaker Arctic Sunrise and its multinational 
crew. However, the actions of Greenpeace were non-violent, therefore, the case was reclassified 
later as hooliganism (Bellona, 2014). Russia indicated that the matter was an issue of internal Russian 
law involving criminal acts against Russian property. As mentioned above, six Greenpeace activists 
approached Prirazlomnaya platform from the Arctic Sunrise, using inflatable boats. Two of them were 
arrested by the border guards of Russian Federal Security Service’s Office in Murmansk Region and 
delivered on board the Ladoga search and rescue vessel. 19 September, the helicopter-borne border 
guards of the Russian Federal Security Service seized the Arctic Sunrise in the exclusive economic 
zone of the RF to convoy it to Murmansk  (RIA novosti, 2013). 
The Russian system of counter-terrorism in maritime regions continues to advance, including the 
Arctic zone. The decree of the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin institutes that the 
Maritime headquarters for counter terrorism will be created in Kaspiisk, Murmansk, Simferopol, and 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, reports TASS. The relevant document published 
on the official website of legal information. 
 "To organise in the cities of Kaspiisk, Murmansk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Simferopol, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
operational headquarters in marine areas (basins) for planning for the use of forces and means of Federal 
enforcement authorities and their territorial bodies on the fight against terrorism, management of counter-
terrorism operations in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the Russian 
Federation and in other Maritime space within which the Russian Federation exercises sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction, as well as on ships, flying the national flag of the Russian Federation", — stated in the 
decree of the President of the Russian Federation (Presidential decreePutinNo664, 2015). 
Russia will establish a new Russian National Guard directly subordinated the president authorized to 
use force and weapons without warning in cases of threats against civilians or soldiers. It can apply 
special means like water cannons and armed vehicles to disperse rallies and will have the right to 
control documents and detain individuals (The Independent Barents Observer, April 12, 2016). 
There may happen cases of violent behavior among the seafarers due to physiologically depressing 
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Arctic climatic condition (Polar nights, lack of sunlight, sensory hunger). The main consequences of 
violence are injuries and loss of human lives, ship owner’s financial losses, damage to the ship’s 
constructions and cargo. 
Terrorist attacks on infrastructure and vessels have never happened in the Russian Arctic, but the 
development of oil and gas activity may increase the risk. This is relevant in the context of open 
borders in the high latitudes of the Russian Arctic (Franz Josef Land). No matter which of the scenarios 
will turn out to be true, it is important to maintain preparedness systems at a relevant level. 
OTHER TYPES OF ACCIDENTS 
Among other types of incidents in the Arctic, the most dangerous are those incurred by ice. Ice can 
damage ship’s hull. Icing can also influence vessel’s stability, even leading to capsizing.  
 
The tug boat "Alexey Kulakovsky" 
The tug boat "Alexey Kulakovsky" with a crew of 14 people sank at night on August 27, 2010 in the 
Laptev sea, 20 miles offshore, at a depth of 20 meters. The sea waves in the area was 2.5 meters 
high, with a western wind of 20 meters per second. The accident killed 11 people, and only three 
seafarers rescued. The commission of Rostransnadzor during their investigation found that a tow 
boat "Alexey Kulakovsky" was technically defective and in an unseaworthy condition with shortages 
in the manning of the crew and failures affecting the seaworthiness of the vessel. The commission 
found that the owner had made an unauthorized technological cutout in the starboard side. In 
addition, as reported by the Federal Agency for transport supervision, the tug boat violated the 
class certificate Russian river register of navigation area for this type of vessel. The cause of sinking 
of the ship is recognized as the "poor organization on struggle for survivability of a vessel and the 
incompetence of the captain". Seven people on board the vessel were students in secondary and 
higher educational institutions. In addition, the captain Soloviev did not have appropriate Maritime 
permitions (Kulakovsky, 2010). 
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The drilling rig ”Kolskaya” 
A Russian drilling rig named Kolskaya with 67 crew on board capsized and sank off Russia's far 
eastern island of Sakhalin on the 18th December 2011 while being towed to a new location through 
a winter storm, within 20 minutes in the Okhotsk Sea. The accident took place at the temperature 
of -17 degrees below zero with water temperature 1 degree Celsius. The platform capsized before 
the crew could get to their rescue rafts. (Grove and Akin, 2011). 
Ice and water damaged the rig and caused water to enter in the vessel thereby causing the rig to 
sink. The oil and gas company AMNGR was responsible for the rig and according to Kireeva and 
Kaminskaya (2011)  The rig, built in Finland in 1985, had been working on a minor gas production 
project in the Sea of Okhotsk for a unit of state-controlled gas export monopoly Gazprom (Grove 
and Akin, 2011). The most of the victims were drilling specialists and not ordinary workers. The 
company’s higher officials claim that the technical condition of the rig was also adequate. It was 
said that the staff was forced to take the rig to the desired location even though it was bad weather. 
The company would have faced a loss if the towing process had to be delayed till February 2012. 
The accident caused deaths of 16 people and 37 people missing. The rescuers saved the lives of 14 
workers on board with the help of planes, helicopters, and rescue vessel while the search for 
missing people was hampered due to sub-zero temperatures (Basharat, 2012). 
 
 
The  jack-up rig “Saturn” 
November 7th, 2014 the old jack-up rig “Saturn” was under towing from the Dolginskoye field in 
the Pechora Sea towards Murmansk when it was struck by the storm. The helipad of platform was 
damaged by the storm and a lifeboat was lost. The entire crew was evacuated from the rig to a 
following support vessel but returned when “Saturn” was moored near Cape Kanin, taking shelter 
from the storm. The press service of the company assures “there were no incidents or disasters at 
the jack-up rig” [BarentsObserver, March 10, 2014]. 
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The “Saturn”, handled by three professional tugboats from Norway, was in a better position than 
the “Kolskaya”, which had been towed by icebreakers that were poorly suited for towing 
(BarentsObserver, November 14, 2014). 
 
The tragic event with the refrigerator trawler “Far East” happened in April 2015 in the Sea of Okhotsk 
shows all the difficulties the emergency services face by maritime accidents in low temperature 
conditions. The wrecked vessel did not get time to signal distress. In some minutes all the crew of 
132 seamen came to icy water. 26 fishing vessels were close by the emergency site but only 63 
seamen were rescued. Rescue efforts were disabled by the rough sea; also the search area was very 
big. The involvement of rescue helicopters was limited by gale-force wind and darkness (rt.com, 
2015). 
 
The rescue boat “Barents-1100” 
The rescue boat “Barents-1100” was caught in a severe storm on 8 June 2014 in the White Sea. All 
emergency services were notified. Rescue helicopter “MI-8” and ships were dispatched to help, 
but it took time for them to reach the vessel in distress. The nuclear submarine “Voronezh” was 
closer to the place, came first and saved the crew and boat (Marine Telegraph, 2014).  
 
The experience shows that great disasters and unwanted consequences can be avoided if we 
cooperate during rescue and preparedness improvements. Norway and Russia have a good tradition 
of mutual help and cooperation. It is very important in border areas.  
On April 19 2013, at 14:50, the Lithuanian vessel “Plutonas” reported a crew member of 60 years to 
have a stroke. The Joint Rescue Coordination Center Northern Norway located in Bodø, asked the 
Murmansk MRCC for the permission to conduct an evacuation of the ill person from the vessel in the 
responsibility area of the Murmansk MRCC. The SAR helicopter from Longyearbyen brought the man 
to Svalbard.  
On May 20 2013, the JRCC NN got a distress signal from the vessel “China PSN”: that there was an 
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injured person onboard. The vessel was in the responsibility area of the Murmansk MRCC, but the 
Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel (CGV) “MAGNUS LAGABOTE” could evacuate the injured man quicker 
to the hospital in Vardø. The permission to cross the Russian border was given orderly; so the 
Norwegian CGV brought the injured man to Vardø.  
April 26, 2015, the vessel “Atriya” reported to the Murmansk MRCC via the phone that the distress 
signal ‘man overboard’ was received at 05.40 from the Lithuanian fishing vessel “PLUTONAS”. The 
Murmansk MRCC provided this information to the JRCC, and the JRCC NN in Bodø started to 
coordinate the rescue operation. The seaman who felt overboard was found within an hour and 
brought to the vessel. Primarily, his state of health was unknown. The JRCC NN planned to involve a 
rescue helicopter from Svalbard that could arrive at the emergency site within 2 hours to evacuate 
the man. Later the seaman was reported as dead (Report of Murmansk MRCC).  
The consequences of accidents greatly depend on place and time, crew training, vessel’s condition 
and compliance with the regulations, preparedness to response, rescue and eliminate the negative 
impact. The most dangerous consequences are coming from large oil spills and accidents with nuclear 
powered vessels. So far, there have not been any large oil spills or accidents with nuclear icebreakers.  
As for violent action and terror, the probability is extremely low. There have never been and 
highjacking or terror events in the Russian Arctic, they are only a theoretical possibility. However, the 
consequences both for lives and the environment may be disastrous. As to consequences, one should 
also take into consideration geographical remoteness of the region, longer response time, and limited 
search and rescue structure, all that can increase the degree of severity of accident consequences.   
The examples above demonstrate that the cooperation between rescue coordination centers, in 
particular, between the Murmansk MRCC and JRCC NN in Bodø, increase the chances for persons in 
distress, injured and ill persons to survive. “The sea is a cruel master and does not excuse mistakes 
and it means that all emergency services must operate as a single mechanism despite of borders and 
political situation” (Report of Murmansk MRCC). 
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4 RISK ASSESSMENT 
The risk assessment for the region is difficult especially as to an evaluation of the probability of an 
event and the possible consequences of the negative events. These are very difficult estimates, and 
are often based on statistics, but abrupt, unpredicted situations may occur that has not happened 
earlier such as the sinking of the cruise ship Costa Concordia outside the coast of Italy due to irrational 
navigation by the captain. Risk assessment is a crucial task for safe navigation. Risk assessment 
preferable would be carrying out by for the entire of crew members on a continuous basis.  
Considering a risk as the amount of harm that can be expected to occur during a given period of time 
due to a specific event, one can give indications on the level of risk. The risk is then the product of 
the probability that an accident happens multiplied by the severity of that harm. In practice, the risk 
level is usually given a coarse-grained categorization, because neither the probability nor the harm 
severity can be estimated with accuracy and precision (Borch et al, 2014). 
Providing the risk assessment for the Russian Arctic sea regions, we believe that the risk of major 
accident here is rather low. Some accident types such as violent action and terror have not happened 
yet, but may also occur in this region. The data for assessments is based on annual reports of Russian 
shipping companies (JSC "Northern shipping company", "Northern river shipping company ", 
"Murmansk shipping company", "Ecotec-Bunker", etc.) and observations (Markov, 2015).  
The following types of events are taken for consideration (Table 8).  
TABLE 8 POSSIBLE VARIATION OF ACCIDENTS, DEPENDING OF SHIP TYPE AND EVENTS 
 Tourist/Cruise 
ship 
Cargo/tanker/petroleum 
Rigs/floaters 
Fishing 
Grounding T-G C-G F-G 
Damage due to collision (sea ice and other) T-I C-I F-I 
Fire  T-F C-F F-F 
Violence/terror T-V C-V F-V 
Other reasons T-O C-O F-O 
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On risk matrixes red area symbols mean high risk, yellow – modern, green – low. We distinguish risk 
for the environment (Table 9) and for people (passengers and crew) (Table 10) (Marchenko et al., 
2015). 
TABLE 9 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR ENVIRONMENT IN RUSSIAN PART OF BARENTS SEA 
5 – Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  T-I F-F   
3 – Occurs  F-G C-I T-F, T-G F-I 
2 – Very Rare  C-F, F-O T-O, T-V C-O  
1 – Theoretically possible   F-V C-G, C-V 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate significant Serious 
TABLE 10 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE IN RUSSIAN PART OF BARENTS SEA 
5 – Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  T-I C-I F-F  
3 – Occurs  F-G T-G,  T-F, F-I  
2 – Very Rare  C-F  F-O C-O,  T-V T-O 
1 – Theoretically possible   F-V C-G C-V 
 Insignificant minor Moderate significant Serious 
 
The tables above demonstrate that the risk to damage environment is greatest in cases of fire and 
collision for fishing vessels and fire and grounding for cruise ships. The risks for people is highest in 
case of fire and other incidents on tourist ships, fire and collision on fishing vessels, and collision of 
cargo ships. The risk related to both grounding and collision with ice is rather high, but the number 
of ships is limited. When it comes to fire and terror there are severe challenges in all regions for life, 
especially for remote areas with severe weather conditions, even though the probability of such 
events are regarded as theoretically low. 
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SUMMARY 
In this report we have studied the potential risk factors for the marine activities and emergency 
response operations in the Russian Arctic, consequences of different types of accidents, suggested 
possible risk matrixes and made some qualitative risk assessments. We came to conclusion that 
though the level of activity is generally low compared to other regions in Russia, and the risk for major 
incidents is low, geographical remoteness from search and rescue centers and severe climatic 
conditions can turn even a minor incident into a major one. We have described human risk factors 
that prevail as the main reason for accidents, technical risks, weather and institutional factors. 
In general, the skill level of the Russian participants in maritime activity complies with international 
standards. The fleet is being modernized, but there are still some ships more than 10 years old, 
especially in the fishing fleet. The search and rescue fleet has received major state investments and 
now has got a number of top-notch rescue vessels of different types.  
The examples of incidents in this report (except the case of the MV "Nina Sagaydak") have revealed 
that the reason for them lies in human factors. In some cases (e.g. the case with a tow boat "Alexey 
Kulakovsky"), the emergencies are caused by both human mistakes and technical factors. However, 
in all cases the actions and decisions taken by the crew of the ship, as well as external stakeholders, 
are crucial. Therefore, special attention should be paid to human resource management, including 
monitoring of staff health to prevent diseases in sea, safety management during works and navigation 
operations, to improve the competence of crews and the personal responsibility of every seafarers. 
Another important issue that is confirmed by the examples is the importance of cross-border 
cooperation between rescue coordination centers and smooth institutional interaction. 
To prepare for future challenges related to possible grow of maritime activity in the Arctic, there is a 
need to further develop technologies, routines and rescue protocols to reduce the probability of 
accidents, to improve personnel training as a first measure for risk management, and to achieve strict 
compliance with existing national and international safety regulations (e.g. the Polar Code). New 
rescue centers and ports being built along the Russian coast once completed will contribute to 
illuminating the risk. There is a continues need to test and develop emergency response in teams for 
different types of incidents including oil spills, collisions, groundings, fires, and even, though rather 
unlikely, violence such as terrorism.  
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It is also important to use the experience of international cooperation in rescue and improving 
preparedness, to avoid disaster and mitigate unwanted consequences. Norway and Russia have a 
good history and experience of cooperation, and it would be beneficial to develop it further. 
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PART II  MARITIME ACTIVITY RISK PATTERNS AND TYPES OF UNWANTED INCIDENTS. 
THE NORWEGIAN WATERS AND SVALBARD SEA AREAS   BY ODD JARL BORCH, 
NATALIA ANDREASSEN AND NATALY MARCHENKO 
 
The increased maritime activity level in sea regions along the coast of mainland Norway and around 
Svalbard affects all areas of emergency preparedness. The commercial activity in the High North 
includes coastal transportation, international Arctic routes transits, exploration, development and 
production of hydrocarbons and other mineral resources, the fisheries, cruise tourism, and other 
research and government activity. The greater variation in types of activities, the increasing number 
and types of vessels, pipelines and installations in sea increase the possibility of unwanted incidents. 
Moreover, the vulnerable environment in the High North contributes to the significance of 
consequences of the unwanted incidents for human life and for natural environment. We illuminate 
that sea areas around mainland Norway and around Svalbard have different geographical features.  
Mainland Norway and Svalbard are distinguished in the natural and social senses, have different 
levels and types of maritime activity and should be considered as providing quite different challenges 
for the emergency preparedness system (Table 11). 
 
TABLE 11 MAIN FEATURES OF THE NORWEGIAN WATERS AND SVALBARD SEA AREAS 
Region  1) Svalbard area 2) Mainland Norway (up to Bear Island on the 
north) 
Boundary 
W-E 
00o00’ and 35 o00’ East 00o00’ and 35 o00’ East 
Boundary 
N-S  
74 o00’- 90 o00’ 66 o34’ and 74 o00’ 
Natural 
features 
Long polar day and night. Harsh 
weather condition: low temperature, 
wind. 
Sea ice in the North 
Short period with polar night/day. 
Strong influence of North-Atlantic current 
Polar low 
No sea ice 
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Economic 
features 
Population ca. 2800 
Very small economic activity 
Population: ca 500 000 
Rather equal activities along the region. 
Oil and gas exploration 
Political 
features 
Norwegian jurisdiction Unmilitary zone 
Fishing and coal mining activities of 
Russia and other nations. 
Norwegian jurisdiction 
Characterist
ics 
navigational 
difficulties 
Sea ice in the North 
Reduced satellite coverage. Lack of 
maps.  
Storms, Icing, “Heavy traffic” on most 
common ship routes and ports 
Maritime 
activity 
Fisheries, Tourism,  
Cargo, Science, Tankers (very few) 
Cargo, Tankers, Fishery, Tourism, Science 
Shipping 
seasonal 
variation  
Large seasonal variation with peak in 
summer 
Quite stable during the year 
SAR 
features 
Local Rescue Coordination Center, 
Svalbard Governor (2 helicopters, 
polarsyssel vessel) with help of 
Longyearbyen Red Cross (emergency 
equipment), Coast Guard (1 vessel) and 
Fire services. Banak helicopters may 
assist. Extremely low human 
resources. 
Joint Rescue Coordination Center Northern 
Norway in Bodø, 20 Local rescue coordination 
Centers at police districts. Well equipped with 
both physical and human resources. 
Helicopters: 2 in Bodø, 2 in Banak, 3 in 
Hammerfest, 5 in Bardufoss and ambulance 
helicopters in Brønnøysund and in Tromsø; 
surveillance and ambulance aircrafts; and 
Coast Guard fleet, a great number of 
voluntary and private organizations. 
In order to ensure adequate capacities for an emergency preparedness system, there is a need to 
increase understanding of the probable risk factors and risk mitigating tools. This chapter provides 
an overview of dominating stressors and risk factors that are especially relevant for the region of 
Mainland Norway and Svalbard. Then the expected activity level is analyzed in light of the probability 
of unwanted incidents. Next, the consequences of possible maritime incidents are presented. The 
report offers then risk assessment matrixes analyzing the frequency of different types of unwanted 
incidents and significance of consequences. Finally, it summarizes the study findings and discusses 
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implications for the national preparedness system relevant in the High North region.   
 
1 DOMINATING RISK FACTORS 
The industrial exploitation of the High North region is developing faster than the development of 
necessary infrastructure and consequently the effective emergency preparedness system. The 
challenges in general are connected to the increased commercial activity, lack of port infrastructure 
and lack of experience under the harsh natural conditions. This section overviews the important risk 
factors or stressors that have a great impact on emergency preparedness system in sea areas around 
Svalbard and along the Norwegian coast in the High North.   
1.1 MAINLAND NORWAY 
The significant undeveloped resources of the Arctic strongly contribute to the increasing interest and 
significant industrial activities in the Arctic (DNV GL, 2012). Along the coast of mainland Norway there 
is an increased traffic connected to petroleum, minerals, fisheries, intra- and inter-regional 
transportation and research activities. The increased traffic density and other activity in sea areas can 
be referred as operational factors raising the likelihood of accidents. Paaske et al. (2014) highlight 
global warming which increases the average temperature in the Arctic twice as fast as elsewhere in 
the world. The increased physical accessibility of the Arctic waters for ships operating may increase 
the number of unwanted incidents.  
The vulnerability of the Arctic environment refers to another stress factor. Environmental factors of 
the Arctic area contribute both on the likelihood of accidents and the consequences to the 
environment and human lives. The increased ship traffic can be in conflict with weather conditions 
and may cause collisions, a variety of hazards, damage for people and for nature. DNV GL (Paaske et 
al., 2014) in their overview of the risks highlight the negative environmental conditions as dominating 
in the Arctic region. Risk generating weather factors influence visibility due to snow, fog, storms etc., 
seasonal variations in light, wind, water and air temperature, current and waves, marine and 
atmospheric icing. The Norwegian Coastal Administration informs also that extreme weather periods 
in the region with strong wind and heavy rain happen more frequently and may lead to significant 
material injuries and fatalities (Kystverket, 2015).  
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There are some stressors that can be regarded as geopolitical factors. They refer to growing global 
demand, shifting market conditions, environmental and political conflicts, and changing geopolitics 
(Stepien et al., 2014). Such factors may influence the situation along the coast even in the relatively 
stable region of Norway, change the demand for Arctic resources and thus industrial activity. 
Paaske et al. (2014) call the lack in experience, navigational competence and crew fatigue as human-
related risk-shaping factors. Communication challenges might also have impact on probability of 
accidents. DNV & FNI (2012) perceive indigenous interests as a risk for industrial accidents in the 
Arctic with greater consequences for human due to the operators’ lack of knowledge. 
Coastal Norway is facing some of the same challenges as the Svalbard region especially during winter 
months: stormy weather, polar lows, darkness, icing and snow. These conditions may severely 
challenge the safety of the traffic along the coast, and hamper the operations of the preparedness 
system. Although, the Svalbard region has some peculiar stressors. 
1.2 SVALBARD AREA  
High Arctic conditions that may affect the probability of incidents include poorly charted waters and 
remoteness, ice, cold and unpredictable weather, and darkness in winter. In addition, 
underdeveloped infrastructure in the High North for maritime shipping creates extra challenges, for 
example limited and unstable radio/satellite communication. This may increase the risk of accidents, 
and may also represent a barrier for the preparedness system that is to mitigate the consequences 
of an incident. 
Seasonal changes in the High Arctic are more dramatic than anywhere else in the world:  freezing and 
melting sea ice, and going from winter darkness to the midnight sun in a very short time. These 
influence the likelihood and costs of commercial activity as well as the consequences of accidents.  
Climate changes are more visible in the Arctic. The average temperature here is increasing twice as 
fast as elsewhere in the world, and the polar ice cap is retracting. At the same time, there are local 
variations in ice conditions from year to year, making predictions difficult. 
The important stressors for the preparedness system are people’s injuries and missing people due to 
sinking ships. The possibility of fire and wrecking is just the same as in other sea areas. However, the 
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limited capacities for mitigating consequences of accidents mean that the consequences may be 
more severe. Better access to information has increased the public’s interest in industrial activity. 
Even though industries such as fishing, hunting, and mining have been there for centuries, the Arctic 
is perceived as the last untouched wilderness on earth. During recent years, Svalbard has been well 
known to the public as a popular tourist attraction. In case of possible industrial development, the 
business actors and authorities are likely to face more public scrutiny than those in the past and in 
other places.  
 
2 ACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS  
The activity of vessels and installations and density of traffic influence directly on the probability of 
incidents. Therefore, in order to describe probability, the report presents statistics for traffic density, 
accidents and the types of vessels or other activity in the sea areas in the coastal Norway and around 
Svalbard.  
Ship traffic is one of the most intensive in the whole High North region. The density of the ship traffic 
pattern for 2015 for the territory of coastal Norway and Svalbard area is demonstrated on the Figure 
below.  
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FIGURE 6 SHIP TRAFFIC COASTAL AREAS OF MAINLAND NORTHERN NORWAY AND AROUND SVALBARD, IN 2015 
 
Source: Havbase, Map over Norwegian areas and ship traffic, AIS database of the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration, http://havbase.no/ 
The NCA’s Havbase is the most updated online service which provides AIS data.  ArcGIS combines and 
integrates existing data about the environment and human activity in the Arctic. Using the interactive mapping 
platforms, the following picture demonstrates traffic density of various types of vessels during spring, summer, 
autumn and winter months.  
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Passenger (yellow), fishing vessels (green) 
July 2016          April 2016       January 2016    October 2015 
 
Oil, gas and chemical products tankers (red), offshore supply ships (purple) 
July 2016          April 2016       January 2016    October 2015 
 
Bulk ships (orange), general cargo and container ships (blue), refrigerators (light blue) 
FIGURE 7 SHIP TRAFFIC LINES FOR DIFFERENT SEASONS AND TYPES OF VESSELS 
 
The Norwegian Maritime Authority controls accidents statistics for all areas in Norway. Table 10 
demonstrates 558 accidents on sea registered in their database for the region between mainland 
Northern Norway and Svalbard for the period from January 2001 to April 2013.   
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TABLE 12 PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC AND INCIDENTS 
 Svalbard area Coastal Norway Other areas in Northern Norway 
Traffic percent 2.71 % 85.32 % 11.97 % 
Total accidents 7 529 22 
Incidents percentage 1.26 % 94.80 % 3.94 % 
Source: Fjørtoft et al., 2015 
 
Most of the incidents happen in the areas between mainland Northern Norway and Svalbard, even 
though total numbers in the Table 10 show that mostly incidents happen in coastal sea areas of 
Northern Norway (www.sjofartsdir.no). The register of the Norwegian Maritime Authority includes 
different types of reported accidents: occupational accidents; grounding; contact damage, piers, etc.; 
fire/explosion; collision; environmental damage; leaking; capsizing; missing vessels and weather 
damage. About half of the reported accidents are occupational accidents. 
The Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) Northern Norway has also a register of all incidents that 
are reported in the sea areas of the Northern Norway (including Svalbard). The amount of registered 
incidents on sea in the Northern Norway is 1208 in 2015 compared to 1122 in 2014 and 1074 in 2013 
(JRCC, 2016).  
The Norwegian Coastal Administration reports on all incidents alerts and emission volume in Norway. 
The overview of all reported incidents divided by different types of events is presented in the Table 
13. In 2015 The Norwegian Coastal Administration received 1098 alerts of risk of acute pollution,  
545 of them did not cause acute pollution. 
 
 
58 
 
TABLE 13 ALL REPORTED INCIDENTS DURING 2012-2015 DIVIDED INTO VARIOUS TYPES OF UNWANTED EVENTS 
Reported events  2012  2013  2014  2015  
Grounding  87  76  75  73  
Vessels in operation  115  160  104  102  
Vessels on fire 17  26  18  16  
Vessel collisions 17  22  13  11  
Other events with vessels  89  138  97  117  
Wreck handling (ship)  17  23  23  7  
Possible pollution at sea  201  229  152  92  
Possible pollution in waterways  -  -  -  6  
Offshore  132  172  165  180  
Marine mammals 6  4  5  5  
Drifting objects  91  98  117  154  
Navigation units  19  23  11  4  
Land transport  109  138  97  123  
Industrial 70  74  65  72  
Agriculture  8  12  13  13  
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Other land-based events  120  108  103  114  
International notification and assistance  11  7  6  2  
Nature events  -  -  -  7  
Total  1109  1310  1064  1100  
Source: Kystverket, 2015a  
Overall, the amount for reported incidents has reduced in 2014 and 2015 comparing to previous 
years. The possible reason for that is the change in the alerting procedures for incidents near and on 
land. The volume of unwanted incidents varies between different sea areas and depends on the 
commercial activity in the areas.  
2.1 MAINLAND NORWAY  
The region has intensive traffic density with a variety of vessels. The coastal sea traffic includes 
passenger and cargo transport and highly interlinked with different commercial activity in the region. 
Traffic includes vessels of 55 different nations, where 39% are Norwegian and 15% are Russian. 
Maritime transport is still dominated by internal and destination traffic. The volume of internal 
transport in coastal regions is relatively stable. Along the coast of mainland Norway, and from 
neighbouring countries, smaller and medium-sized vessels are mostly in use. The most traffic includes 
fishing vessels, cargo ships and tankers (havbase.no). 
Traffic statistics for routes with compulsory pilotage between Norway and abroad and between 
Norwegian ports presented by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, counts for 16942 routes in the 
Northern Norway for 2013. In addition to those routes, there are many smaller routes that are not 
obliged for compulsory pilotage (9688 routes in 2013) and vessels exempted from the obligation (293 
routes in 2013) (www.kystverket.no). Intercontinental transport is primarily related to the Northern 
Sea Route (Northeast Passage) between Europe and Asia. There are a few tanker vessels transits 
under the Norwegian flag each year (http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits).  
Maritime tourism is linked to small and large passenger vessels. There is a strong increase in both the 
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number of ships and passengers and the sailed distance along the coast of Norway. Larger cruise 
ships with thousands persons on-board are operating. The largest passenger transport ship is the 
coastal steamer Hurtigruten AS with up to 1,100 people on board. There is also a growing amount of 
leisure vessels. Among these are many unexperienced sailors and they more often face challenges 
with the need for help from the preparedness system. 
A significant increase in traffic is reached by shipping goods between supply bases and installations 
on land and floating offshore platforms. Initially the traffic goes from Sandnessjøen and Hammerfest, 
firstly from the Goliat field, from the Aasta Hansteen gas field in the Norwegian sea and in future 
from the Johan Castberg field in the Barents Sea. Many involved cargo routes belong to the special 
category of risk vessels. The Norwegian Coastal Administrations data system reports about 158 risk 
vessels per month on average for the region, according data for 2015 (Kystverket, 2015b). In 2015, 
1899 voyages of "risk vessels" was registered in in the Barents sea area, while in 2014 there were 
1642 against 1584 voyages in 2013 (Kystverket, 2015b). There are also many specialized vessels that 
are designed for the exploration and extraction of natural gas and oil (Arctic Council, 2009). In 2015, 
424 voyages transporting oil and gas products were registered in 2015 within Barents Sea (Kystverket, 
2015b).  
An increased oil and gas exploration activity is expected after the 23 license round in the Northern 
and Eastern part of the Barents Sea. DNV GL has carried out a risk assessment for two main areas in 
the licencing round on behalf of the BASEC consortium of oil companies involved in the Norwegian 
part of the Barents Sea1. Their study emphasized challenges such as distances to  hospitals, rescue 
resources and depots, wave heights, wind speed, low water temperatures, fog and icing hampering 
both helicopters and vessels as risk aspects. 
The activity of the fishing fleet takes place both close to shore and in open waters almost all year long. 
Farther from the mainland Norway there is all-year activity maintained by a number of large sea-
going vessels, including factory vessels with a large crew. According to the database from the Ministry 
of Trade and Fishery, there are 3478 fishing vessels registered in the Northern Norway areas during 
2015 (www.fiskeridir.no). In respect of possible incidents, it is important to categorize fishing boats 
                                                                
1 DNV-GL 2016. AREA Report - SSEPA Barents Sea. South West. Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration 
61 
 
by criteria: engine power or length. The fishing fleet of the Northern Norway includes 1772 small 
fishing boats with length under 10 meters, 1629 medium-sized and  77 large vessels with length over 
28 meters (Fiskedirektoratet, 2016). The overall engine power has a small increase yearly 
(www.fiskeridir.no). 
There is also a growing research, exploration and observation activity in the High North, which 
includes various research vessels designed for multiple purposes including navigation through ice 
waters. Government vessels can belong to different jurisdictions. The Norwegian coast guard has four 
larger vessels for operations in the High North including the icebreaker KV Svalbard. In addition, they 
have 10 vessels for closer to coast operations. The sailing patterns include patrol in the Barents Sea 
and Svalbard region, and all along the Norwegian coast. In the Barents Sea one-two vessels may be 
present most of the time. The Norwegian navy has five ultra-modern frigates and six MTB, six 
submarines and six mine hunters, together with logistics vessel. Not more than 20 per cent of the 
sailing time of this fleet in 2014 could be referred to the Northern Norway. 
 
2.2 SVALBARD AREA  
There are four main groups of vessels in the Svalbard area: tourist, cargo, research and fishing vessels. 
Vardø sjøtrafikksentral (Vardø Vessel Traffic Services, VTS) is the information unit of the Norwegian 
Coastal Administration (NCA), collecting data about traffic in the Svalbard zone throughout the year, 
using the AIS system. The special online service ArkGIS (Arctic Geographical Information System - 
http://arkgis.org/) has been used to demonstrate images of ship traffic in Svalbard area.  
 Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Passenger-blue lines; Fishing vessels – yellow lines 
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General cargo – light blue lines, bulk ships – orange lines 
    
Tankers (chemical product and oil) – red lines, reefers – green lines. 
    
FIGURE 8 SHIP TRAFFIC LINES FOR DIFFERENT SEASONS AND TYPES OF VESSELS 
Naturally, the cruise ships dominate by the number of people, but the fishing vessels largely dominate 
by numbers. Due to ice and weather conditions, the ship traffic has large seasonal variation. The 
Norwegian Coastal Administrations data system shows that the number of fishing vessels changes 
from 10-20 in January-May, to 30-40 vessels in June-August, and 50-60 vessels in September-
December.  
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The tourist season starts in May with about 2 ships. In July-August there are 15 to 30 ships, in 
September around 10, and 2-4 ships at the end of the season until October.  
There are 2 cargo ships on fixed routes and 5-6 other dry bulk vessels that have random calls, with 
about 15-20 trips a year combined. There is also a reefer (freezer) ship, receiving fish from 2-4 Russian 
trawlers almost all year.  
A few research vessels operate year round on Svalbard. Additional 5-8 vessels come during the period 
July to September. There are about 25-35 calls by ships carrying coal from Svea from July to December, 
but from 22.september 2016, the transport of coal is reduced because of stop in the production in 
Svea. During autumn months Barentsburg and Longyearbyen are visited by 2 to 3 bulk carriers. There 
are also tankers supplying fishing vessels, cruise ships and the villages. The number is about 10 tanker 
vessel visits throughout the year. 
The studies by Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket, 2014) and DNV GL (Paaske et al., 2014), 
show that there have been 48 ship accidents during the past 15 years in Svalbard. Most of them did 
not result in significant release of pollutants or damage. A ship accident involving the release of fuel 
or cargo is likely to occur in Svalbard every sixth year on average, according to analyses future traffic 
patterns. The average spill size (for the whole area of research) is estimated to 3 ton per/year 
(Kystverket, 2014). Fishing vessels are likely to be responsible for most such incidents since they 
account for two-thirds of marine traffic, but accidents involving large cruise ships are likely to have 
the greatest impact due to their size and amount of passengers.   
The Norwegian Coastal Administration expresses uncertainty how the prohibition that restricts 
vessels to use heavy fuel oil in the national parks (around Svalbard) will affect the maritime traffic 
that use or bring heavy fuel oil. Currently ships sailing in and out of Isfjorden do use heavy fuel oil 
(Kystverket, 2014). More detail information about ship traffic and estimated activity in mainland 
Norway and around Svalbard area is presented in the MARPART project report 1. 
 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT INCIDENTS  
Accidents are the consequences of complex coincidences and factors. The severity of maritime 
64 
 
accidents greatly depends on the geographical place and time, the capacity and preparedness to 
response, rescue and eliminate the negative impact (Marchenko et al., 2015). Historically records of 
ship causalities identify major losses connected to fire, explosion, grounding, collision and foundering 
(Soares and Teixeira, 2001). In the Arctic region, these records are tested by quite a few disasters. 
The range of possible negative accidents include grounding, damage due to collision with sea ice or 
other objects, fire, terror/ violence, and other reasons (Marchenko et al., 2015). 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration reports on the total amount of emissions in sea areas. The 
statistics for emissions in the Barents sea and Norwegian sea waters is presented in the Tables below. 
TABLE 14 NUMBER OF REPORTED EMISSIONS TO SEA AREAS IN BARENTS SEA AND NORWEGIAN SEA 
Sea areas  Total emissions 2013  Total emissions 2014  Total emissions 2015  
Barents sea  42  38  35  
Norwegian sea 70  52  64  
 
 
TABLE 15 VOLUME OF EMISSIONS TO SEA AREAS IN BARENTS SEA AND NORWEGIAN SEA (LITERS) 
Sea areas  Volume emissions 2013  Volume emissions 2014  Volume emissions 2015  
Barents sea  6,8  104,6  51,7  
Norwegian sea 39,6  283,2  217,8  
 
3.1 MAINLAND NORWAY  
The high density of maritime traffic in the coastal Norway influences the high probability of accidents; 
even though the coastal authorities have made important efforts to reduce the probability of severe 
accidents by means of vessel traffic zones, emergency towing boats, traffic control and certification 
demands. The cold climate in winter increases the risk to people’s life in accidents because of 
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operational difficulties of rescue operations and the reduced time available for the rescue. Vessels 
operating all year round have the highest risk. These are fishing vessels and large passenger ships 
which operate most part of the year.  
One of the most serious negative effects on the local ecosystems may be caused by heavy oil spills. 
As an example, the cruise liner M/V Marco Polo grounded on the Lofoten archipelago in November 
2014 with 800m3 fuel oil on board. The ship was aground on soft mud and refloated the same night 
without damage to the ship or its 750 passengers. Luckily, no pollution occurred. Otherwise, severe 
consequences for ecosystems in this area could happen affecting a very sensitive nature, a large 
amount of tourist attractions and industry.    
Following one of the biggest incident in offshore oil and gas activity, the Macondo oil spill in April 
2010, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy announced that the incident could become 
a lesson for safety and emergency preparedness in connection with drilling and well operations on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf (PSA, 2014). Subjects that call for special attention in the whole 
industry in Norway are well integrity, prevention of oil spills, gas leaks and maritime incidents, and 
modernization of installations and plants. Within the framework for prevention of oil pollution from 
Arctic maritime activity, Arctic Council plans to strengthen traffic monitoring and management, 
improve maritime services, reduce risks associated with use and transport of heavy fuel oil (Arctic 
Council, 2015) 
Oil and gas industry represents high risk even though the number of unwanted accidents is very few. 
Worst-case scenario is a risk approach to assess the probability of a major oil spill together with 
associated environmental impacts in a particular context. Some assessments were done related to 
petroleum exploitation in the Lofoten area (Hauge et al., 2014). Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection DSB (2013) suggested a worse-case scenario of a serious blow-out lasting 43 days with 
total discharge volume 300000 tonnes of oil on a drilling rig on the Norwegian continental shelf. They 
assessed that the highest consequences will affect nature and the environment affecting up to 3000 
km of coastline and may cost for the economy up to 10 billion NOK. The Risikogruppen (2010) 
suggested the worst-case scenario for Barents Sea and the Lofoten area. In this especially valuable 
and vulnerable northern area such a serious blowout as the one happened in the Gulf of Mexico, may 
have more complications and negative impacts. The Macondo blowout lasted 87 days approximately 
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41 nautical miles from land and the spill amounted to 800000 cm3. The worst-case scenario assesses 
the risk of such unwanted accident can be once in 750 years during the exploration phase. The 
consequences will have negative effects on the fish species with a recovery period of three years, 
one year for the beaches, 10 years for the sea birds (Risikogruppen, 2010). 
The increased petroleum and oil and gas transport shipping activity in the Barents Sea causes the 
concern for safety and preparedness (PSA, 2014). Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB, 
2013) in the analysis of a National risk scenarios highlights a link between the distance sailed (extent 
of maritime traffic) and the number of accidents at sea that could entail danger to life, health, the 
environment and material assets. Statistically, there has been a strong increase in the number of 
navigational accidents since 2005. The increase by 16% is estimated in overall maritime traffic along 
the Norwegian Coast from 2008 to 2025.  
Transport by sea is considered to be a relatively safe form of transport, but the consequences can be 
serious. Accidents happening closer to the shore can be challenging for coastal transport. Intensive 
shipping and increased industrial activity mean disposal of all kinds of waste. The approximate 
amount of oil sludge generated annually by ships operating in the Norwegian and Barents seas is 
13,000 metric tons (Arctic Council, 2009). Vessels carry hazardous and/or toxic cargo and may contain 
radioactive materials. There is a major risk in sea transport linked to uncontrolled emissions of toxic, 
environmentally harmful materials that can have affect on seabirds, marine mammals and shoreline 
habitat (DSB, 2013). 
3.2 SVALBARD AREA  
Oil spills and life-threatening accidents with large cruise ships are the most discussed events due to 
the consequences and the limited preparedness capacity for search and rescue, hospital care and oil 
spill response. Fortunately, there have not been any large marine oil spills in the Svalbard area and 
totally in the Arctic, so there is not local experience to learn from. The most relevant previous oil spill 
to learn from is the Exxon Valdez disaster (Alaska, March 1989). 42,000 m3 of crude oil were spilled 
from the reef tanker), which happened in the sub-Arctic and had a range of negative effects on the 
local ecosystems. International Maritime Organization introduced comprehensive marine pollution 
prevention rules (MARPOL) through various conventions as a reaction on this event. 
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There are only few tankers operating of much smaller size in Svalbard area now, so these types of 
accident and consequences has a very low probability.  
It can increase significantly, however, in the case of sea ice reduction and more active usage of Arctic 
routes for transportation (Smith and Stephenson, 2013). 
 That is why Norwegian government pays attention to the increasing of preparedness to oil spill 
(Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2010). The Norwegian Coastal Administration analyses preparedness 
against acute pollution mainly based on environmental risk in conjunction with possible oil spills from 
marine traffic. The report recommends to provide Fast system for deploying booms around leaking 
vessels during high season, May – November, and provide Contractual coastal OR vessels with a 
demand for certification and training programs. The Norwegian Coastal Administration suggests 
further that within the research area there should be a broad selection of vessels and resources. This 
will enhance the ability to handle operational challenges that are common in arctic conditions. Finally, 
the NCA will need to cooperate with the Governor of Svalbard to clarify expectations and operational 
patterns in cases where oil spills may occur (Kystverket, 2014).  
The most significant challenge posed by an arctic oil spill is dealing with oil in ice. Ice can make it more 
difficult to find a spill, reach it and deploy equipment and personnel to respond. However, ice can act 
as a natural barrier and prevent oil from spreading. Cooler temperatures and waves dampened by 
the ice can also slow the breakdown or “weathering” process of oil. This can increase the window of 
opportunity for recovery, dispersants and in-situ burning. 
There have been two large accidents with tourist ships in the Svalbard area (Maxim Gorkiy, 1989 and 
Heanseatic, 1997 – see (Marchenko, 2015) for detail. Thanks to good weather conditions, they both 
ended without any big injuries or human losses or oil spills. While Hanseatic had Polarsyssel present 
at the site when the accident happened, pluss 3 coast guard ships during the next 24 hours, the case 
of the Maxim Gorkiy accident really demonstrated the difficulties of rescue operation in such a 
remote area.  
Possible accidents with fishing boats are frequent in the Svalbard area. They produce the same 
problems/consequences of two mentioned above, but on a smaller scale. Fishing boats carry a much 
smaller amount of fuel and usually have 10-30 persons on the board. This type of accident has a 
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relatively high probability of occurring, though. 
 
4 RISK ASSESSMENT  
Risk refers to the probability of being affected by the unwanted consequences of a hazard. It 
combines the significance of consequences and degree of vulnerability. The risk assessments 
characterize the risks posed to individuals and environment by potentially harmful maritime 
accidents. Risk estimation is based on an evaluation of the probability of an event and the possible 
consequences of the negative events. These are very difficult estimates, and are often based on 
statistics. In this report risk assessments are based on previous studies and statistics and represents 
a qualitative assessment of the amount of harm that can be expected to occur during a given time 
period due to a specific event. The level of the risk is then the product of the probability that an 
accident happens multiplied by the severity of its consequences. In practice, the risk level is usually 
given a coarse-grained categorization, because neither the probability nor the harm severity can be 
estimated with accuracy and precision. Some accident types such as violent action and terror have 
not yet happened, but may occur also in this region. Although this approach has been criticized (Cox 
Jr, 2008), it is widely used for risk assessment and gives adequate depiction and fruitful ideas for 
preparedness improvement. 
The following analyses in different sea areas used information presented in risk assessments by 
Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket, 2014, 2015a), DNV GL (Paaske et al., 2014); the SADA 
report; (Stepien et al., 2014); the AMSA report (Arctic Council, 2009); some provisions from the 
National Risk Analysis by DSB (Norwegian Directorate for civil Protection (DSB), 2013) and the 
incidents statistics 2013 of Norwegian Maritime Authority (www.sjofartsdir.no). For the Svalbard 
area, an overview of Longyearbyen port current and planned activities (Multiconsult, 2014) and risk 
analysis performed by Governor of Svalbard on 2013 (Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2013) were used. 
In addition, risk assessments have been discussed at the MARPART project meeting in Murmansk on 
10 April 2015 with different specialists: rescue and police officers, lawyer and economists, 
geographers and navigators.  
Risk matrixes interpret the type perceptions of accidents, which may happen in a certain sea area, 
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and a range of possible consequences. Risk matrixes for Norwegian waters have been created as a 
result of the analysis of type of events and ship traffic features. It is relevant to consider the following 
types of events (see Table 16). 
TABLE 16 POSSIBLE VARIATION OF ACCIDENTS, DEPENDING OF SHIP TYPE AND EVENTS 
 Tourist/Cruise 
ship 
General cargo/tanker 
vessels/rigs and floaters  
Fishing 
Grounding T-G C-G F-G 
Damage due to collision (sea 
ice and other) 
T-I C-I F-I 
Fire  T-F C-F F-F 
Violence/terror T-V C-V F-V 
Other reasons T-O C-O F-O 
Grounding means the ship hits land or underwater rock. Damage due to collision includes both 
collision with other vessels/sea installations and sea ice. The category fire is about fire breaking out 
on board. The category violence means incidents of violent behavior towards persons and physical 
installations. The category other may include construction failure. On the following risk matrixes red 
area symbols high risk, yellow – modern, green – low. We also distinguish risk of consequences for 
the environment and for people (passengers and crew). 
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TABLE 17 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR ENVIRONMENT IN SVALBARD AREA 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-I T-I,T-G,   
2 - Very Rare  F-O,F-F T-O,  C-O, C-I, 
T-F, C-F 
 
1 - Theoretically possible   F-V, C-V, T-V C-G,  
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
 
TABLE 18 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE (PASSENGERS, CREW) IN SVALBARD AREA 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-I  T-I,T-G  
2 -Very Rare  F-O C-O, C-I,T-O F-F T-F, C-F 
1 - Theoretically possible   C-G F-V,C-V T-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
The tables above show that in the Svalbard region, the risk for environment is mostly middle and 
partly low. For people, the most dangerous events are fire on the major types of vessels and almost 
all accidents with tourist vessels. Low risk is estimated for grounding incidents with cargo and fire on 
fishing vessels. 
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TABLE 19 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR ENVIRONMENT IN COASTAL NORWAY 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-F  C-F C-G 
2 -Very Rare   T-F  T-G  
1 - Theoretically possible  F-V   T-V, C-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
 
 
TABLE 20 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE IN COASTAL NORWAY 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently    F-G  
3 - Occurs    C-G, C-F, F-F T-F 
2 - Very Rare     T-G 
1 - Theoretically possible    C-V, F-V T-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
The tables above show that at the Norwegian mainland coastline, the frequency of grounding and 
fire among fishing vessels is quite high due to the number of vessels and the vessels operating in most 
years along a very challenging coastline. There is quite heavy cargo vessel traffic along the coastline, 
and the probability of grounding was earlier quite high, especially in winter. Better control of vessels’ 
technical quality, increased demands for coastal sailing certificates, pilot services and the Vessel 
Traffic System (VTS) has reduced the frequency of grounding. For the environment, grounding of 
cargo vessels and cruise ship, even though they may occur only rarely, may have severe 
consequences, not at least because of the heavy fuel oil used and a vulnerable coast line with wildlife, 
fisheries, fish farming, tourist income and leisure activities. Oil spill response may also be severely 
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hampered by bad weather, ice and snow, such as the Full City grounding outside Langesund in 
Telemark in 2009. The ship had 1100 tons of heavy fuel oil on-board. 200 tons leaked out and 
approximately 2500 sea birds lost their lives because of this accident. The oil spill response operation 
took almost one year. 
As for risk to life, fire on board ships is a serious threat, not at least on board cruise/tourist ships. The 
engine room explosion and the following fire on board the coastal steamer M/V Nordlys outside the 
town of Ålesund in 2011 resulted in two lives lost and 16 wounded. More lives among the 262 persons 
on-board could have been at stake if the fire had started in heavy weather and far from the nearest 
harbour. If a grounding occurs with a cruise ship along the Norwegian coast in winter, this may also 
have severe consequences. As for violent action and terror, the probability may be extremely low. 
However, the consequences both for lives and the environment may be disastrous. 
SUMMARY  
Along the coast of mainland Norway and around Svalbard there is a change in traffic patterns 
connected to petroleum, minerals, fisheries, intra- and inter-regional transportation and research 
activities. Migrating fish resources, new areas opened for oil and gas activity, increased physical 
accessibility of the Arctic waters for ships operating in the Svalbard region may increase the number 
of unwanted incidents, in spite of efforts to reduce the probability through among other stricter 
regulations.  High Arctic conditions that may affect the probability of incidents include poorly charted 
waters, ice and icing, unpredictable weather, and darkness in winter. Seasonal changes in the High 
Arctic are dramatic and difficult to foresee. They influence on the commercial activity as well as the 
consequences of accidents. Lack of experience, navigational competence and crew fatigue is human-
related risk-shaping factors that increases with operations in the autumn and winter months. There 
are limited capacities for mitigating the consequences of large-scale accidents including many 
persons, or pollution from large dangerous goods spills to sea. This means that the consequences 
may be more severe in case of accidents involving larger vessels such as oil rigs and cruise vessels. 
The oil and gas industry has an obligation to do thorough risk assessments and build up their own 
SAR and oil spill response capacity. This is not the case for the cruise industry. This means that the 
government has to do more thorough risk assessments and consider the need for emergency 
capacities in the areas where cruise vessels are most frequent.   
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The coastal sea traffic in Norway includes passenger and cargo transport and highly interlinked with 
different commercial activity in the region. Traffic includes vessels of 55 different nations, where 39% 
are Norwegian. The most traffic includes fishing vessels, cargo ships and tankers. The main four 
groups of vessels in the Svalbard area are tourist, cargo, research and fishing vessels. The cruise ships 
dominate as to number of people, but the fishing vessels largely dominate by numbers. Most of the 
incidents happen in the areas between mainland Northern Norway and Svalbard, even though total 
numbers shows that mostly incidents happen in coastal sea areas of Northern Norway and about half 
of the reported accidents are occupational accidents. 
Oil spills and life-threatening accidents with large cruise ships are the most discussed events due to 
the consequences and the limited preparedness capacity for search and rescue, hospital care and oil 
spill response. The density of maritime traffic in the coastal Norway may increase the probability of 
oil spill due to grounding and collisions. The vessels operating all year round have the highest risk in 
this case. There is a cargo vessel traffic along the coastline all year round, and the probability of 
grounding is quite high, especially in winter.  The frequency of grounding, leakages and fire in the 
fishing fleet is quite high due to the number of vessels, and the vessels operating during the autumn 
and winter months under harsh conditions. With more large-sized cruise vessel arrivals along the 
Norwegian coast in the months with challenging weather conditions and darkness, we may 
experience changes in the risk pattern towards significant higher risk levels. 
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PART III   MARITIME ACTIVITY RISK PATTERNS AND TYPES OF UNWANTED 
INCIDENTS. THE ICELANDIC SEA AREAS  BY VALUR INGIMUNDARSON AND HALLA 
GUNNARSDÓTTIR 
This report identifies current risks and vulnerabilities with respect to preparedness capacity in the 
sea around Iceland. First, it analyses the dominating risk factors. Second, it estimates the probability 
of life or environment threatening incidents. Third, it looks into the consequences of possible 
maritime incidents. Fourth, it offers a risk assessment for different incidents in the Icelandic Search 
and Rescue Region (SRR). Finally, it discusses new policy and legal challenges related to maritime 
activity and security.  
Iceland’s maritime preparedness system aims at preventing and assuring fast response to any 
accidents on sea, which pose risks to human lives or the environment. The Icelandic Coast Guard 
(ICG) is the key operational actor responsible Search and Rescue (SAR) and protection against 
unlawful accidents. In the event of incidents that threaten the environment, the Environment Agency 
is the central authority, while the ICG would act in an operational capacity. The National 
Commissioner of the Icelandic Police (NCIP), however, is in charge of tactical police operations at sea.  
1 DOMINATING RISK FACTORS  
The main vulnerabilities for maritime traffic in the sea around Iceland are: (1) weather conditions; (2) 
ships’ condition and equipment; (3) risk of fire; and (4) risk of human mistakes or errors in decision-
making.2 Within the entire Search and Rescue Region of Iceland – which is 19 times the size of the 
country itself –higher temperatures have led to increasing drift ice. This can cause severe accidents, 
resulting in threats to human lives and to the environment.  
While some cruise vessels are not equipped for harsh sea conditions,3 most of them are relatively 
new and considered suitable for the Arctic. The cargo vessels and tankers fleet have, on the other 
hand, come of age and are not in as good condition. Competition and pressure for lower prices have 
resulted in some companies using older vessels and under-paid (and under-trained) crews. Every 
                                                                
2 “Summary of Cruise Vessels Safety at Faxaflóahafnir”. 2012 
3 Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal, and Military Factors.” Prepared by a commission under the chairmanship 
of Prof. Valur Ingimundarson, March 2009. English Summary available at: 
http://www.mfa.is/media/Skyrslur/A_Risk_Assessment_for_Iceland_-_English_Summary.pdf 
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week, the ICG interferes with vessels that are not equipped or operated in accordance with 
mandatory standards. This can pose a great risk to the lives of crewmembers and rescuers and to the 
environment. Needless to mention, under-trained crewmembers are more likely to make wrong 
decisions under pressure, which, again, increases the likelihood of accidents. The same can be 
indicated about tired and overworked crewmembers. A case in point is the grounding of Akrafell east 
of Iceland in September 2014, where the navigation officer had fallen asleep. Owing to good weather, 
the crew was saved and pollution prevented, but the vessel was damaged.  
The case of Akrafell also revealed certain weaknesses in the Icelandic preparedness system due to 
budget cuts, resulting from the 2008 financial crisis in Iceland. Only one patrol vessel, Ægir, was 
available, and it took an extra effort to gather a crew for Þór, which was in port in Reykjavík. The ICG’s 
airplane, TF-SIF, was located in Iceland to monitor the volcanic eruption in Bárðarbunga, but is usually 
abroad on funded projects at this time of the year. The plane is equipped with maritime radar that 
can detect pollution fast and accurately, and did so in this case. The Akrafell operation was successful, 
but the lack of manpower and the absence of the ICG’s airplane, helicopters and patrol vessels could 
pose future challenges in similar situations. 
Grounding and ship fires are well-known risk factors. Priority is given to human safety followed by 
measures to pre-empt environmental accidents, which can include preventing the distressed vessel 
from burning completely down. Finally, the operation aims at salvaging the vessel or other properties 
at stake.  
If oil production at the Dreki area North East of Iceland will commence, it will add factors that can 
pose risk to human lives and the environment. This includes: 1) sudden incidents related to oil drilling; 
2) incidents related to production, such as a broken pipeline (which could go unnoticed for a while); 
and 3) accidents related to vessel traffic. However, the current activity level in the area is very low 
and will remain so in the next 10–15 years. 
2 ACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS 
Fishing vessels make up the largest part of maritime traffic in the sea around Iceland. Traditionally, 
fatal accidents on sea prevail in the area, but their number has decreased drastically in the past 
decades from an average of 20 a year in the 1970s to 2 in the first decade of the 21st century. In 
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relation to the shrinkage of the fishing fleet, the decrease is still significant. This progress can among 
other reasons be explained by the improved safety surveillance, better-equipped vessels and 
lifeboats, and mandatory safety and survival training for seamen.4 Fatal accidents are, however, not 
the only concern for seamen. Injuries and illnesses can be life-threatening since it may take long time 
to get medical aid. Illnesses are hard to predict, but owing to better equipment, injuries from 
accidents are less likely to occur than before.  
As for the risk of fire, the ICG normally deals with a few, mostly minor incidents on sea each year, 
frequently relying on assistance from the Capital District Fire and Rescue Service. While improved 
preventions decrease the likelihood and the harm of fire, such incidents are always to be expected. 
The operations are rarely as difficult as the massive fire that broke out in the engine room of MV 
Fernanda in the fall of 2013, south of the Westman Islands (Vestmannaeyjar). The crew of 11 failed 
to extinguish the fire and, eventually, gathered on the vessel’s deck where an ICG’s helicopter came 
to rescue. After fighting the fire, the vessel was towed away from fishing areas into Hafnarfjörður 
port in the southwest of Iceland. When entering the port, it was discovered that the fire was still alive, 
and the smoke spread over residential and commercial areas. Fernanda was brought back to the open 
sea, as far away from fishing and spawning areas as possible, to continue the fire fighting and cooling 
process. Five days later, and seven days after the fire, Fernanda was towed to the southwest port of 
Grundarfjörður and, eventually, it was brought to Helguvík on the Reykjanes peninsula for demolition.  
The grounding of the containership MV Vikartindur in 1997 and of the Cypriot bulk carrier Wilson 
Muuga in 2006 sparked a debate over sea safety, sea routes, and pollution prevention around Iceland. 
In the case of Vikartindur, the ship’s captain refused to receive assistance until an hour before the 
ship, whose engine was dead, grounded at the south coast of Iceland. The rescue operation resulted 
in the death of an Icelandic Coast Guard’s rescue man. Pollution was prevented, but it turned out to 
be a demanding task to clean up the coastline. In the wake of this event, the legal framework was 
revised to guarantee the right of Icelandic authorities to intervene in case of a life or environment-
threatening situation. The rescue operation of Wilson Muuga, which also resulted in the death of a 
rescue man from a nearby Danish patrol vessel, was administratively simpler, however, harsh 
                                                                
4  See e.g. http://www.visindavefur.is/svar.php?id=65017 and 
http://imh.mug.edu.pl/attachment/attachment/1326/2007_x04.pdf  
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weather conditions made pollution prevention difficult to manage.  
Legal amendments were subsequently made to guarantee the maximum financial responsibility of 
shipping companies in cases of grounding or environmental accidents. Cooperation canals between 
the Icelandic Coast Guard and the Environmental Agency were reviewed and emergency ports were 
identified in different places around the country. Finally, a new regulation on sailing routes south and 
southwest of Iceland, where most of the maritime traffic is directed, entered into force. An earlier 
attempt to pass such regulation had failed due to the opposition of shipping companies.5 
According to the regulation, approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in July 2007, 
ships are only allowed to use certain routes in the area, depending on their size, cargo and capacity. 
The main aim is to guarantee the most secure sailing routes and to limit the likelihood and harm of 
pollution accidents.6 Grounding is, therefore, less likely than before to pose a threat to human lives 
and the environment. Ships are obliged to notify port authorities on possible sea pollution and 
polluting accidents (if more than 100 l. of polluting materials are discharged to the ocean). In Faxaflói, 
there is an average of 3–4 reported pollution incidents each year, but so far, none of them has been 
serious.7 
As for illegal activities, several drug smuggling attempts have been prevented in Iceland’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The threat of a terrorist attack in Iceland is considered low, and there have 
been no signs of such activities.8 However, according to a recent risk assessment, performed by the 
National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, members of ISIS (the Islamic State) have passed 
through Iceland on way from North America to the Middle East. The police also reports that ISIS 
                                                                
5 “Áfangaskýrsla starfshóps um leiðastjórnun skipa, neyðarhafnir og varnir gegn mengun frá siglingum” (Progress Report 
on Sailing Routes, Emergency Ports and Marine Pollution Prevention).  2007. Siglingastofnun. Retrieved from 
http://ww2.sigling.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=3365  
6 “Progress Report”. 2007  
7  Faxaflóahafnir Associated Icelandic Ports Annual Reports 2006-2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.faxafloahafnir.is/category/is/fyrirtaekid/arsskyrslur/  
8  “Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal, and Military Factors.” Prepared by a commission under the 
chairmanship of Prof. Valur Ingimundarson, March 2009. Available in Icelandic at: 
http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/Skyrsla_um_ahattumat_fyrir_Island_a.pdf. English Summary 
available at: http://www.mfa.is/media/Skyrslur/A_Risk_Assessment_for_Iceland_-_English_Summary.pdf. and 
Proposal of a Parliamentary Committee for the development of National Security Policy for Iceland.” February 2014. 
Unofficial English translation available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iceland/documents/press_corner/20140324_en.pdf. 
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propaganda may encourage individuals to commit serious crimes in Iceland.9 This threat is, however, 
still considered low.  
Following the 2007 decision to resume whaling, Iceland has, again, become under intense scrutiny 
by animal protection organizations. While the campaign for animal welfare is, in general, peaceful, 
there are examples of sabotage and vandalism. Recent examples are found in Japan. As for Iceland, 
one historical case should be mentioned: Members of the Sea Shepherd environmental organization 
sank two whaling ships in the port of Reykjavík in 1986. No one was injured, but according to the 
whaling company, damages were estimated of $2 million.10  
 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT INCIDENTS  
RISKS TO HUMAN LIVES 
In the event of serious accidents or illnesses at sea, the long distance to medical services poses risks 
to seamen. In one recent instance (September 2014), it took over ten hours to transport an injured 
seaman from Reykjafoss, 500 nm southwest of Iceland. Assistance was requested from the Danish 
patrol vessel Triton, which was located 285 nm from Reykjafoss. The two vessels steamed towards 
each other until Triton’s helicopter was able to fly to Reykjafoss. The helicopter, then, had to return 
to Triton to refuel and wait until the distance to land was within the flight range limits. 
While most large passenger ships and cruise vessels would have essential medical services on board, 
there are risk factors that have to be taken into account. Should an accident – whether related to 
fire, grounding or something else – involve more than one person, the challenges become much 
greater. In the event of a ferry or cruise vessel accident, it could take days to deport hundreds or 
thousands of people by helicopters and lifeboats to land, and even longer if people are injured. The 
average sea temperature in Reykjavík is at its highest in July, or little above 11°C, while in March, it is 
only 5°C.11 The chances of surviving a long time in such a cold sea are poor. If an accident takes place 
                                                                
9 “Mat ríkislögreglustjóra á hættu af hryðjuverkum og öðrum stórfelldum árásum” (NCIP Assessement on the Risk of 
Terrorism and other Large Scale Attacks). February 2015. Ríkislögreglustjóri. Retrieved from 
http://www.logreglan.is/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Mat-r%C3%ADkislögreglustjóra-á-hættu-af-hryðjuverkum-og-
öðrum-stórfelldum-árásum.pdf  
10 See e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/20/world/around-the-world-whaling-ships-refloated-in-iceland.html  
11 See e.g. http://www.seatemperature.org/europe/iceland/reykjavk.htm  
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north of Iceland, but within the Icelandic Search and Rescue region, the chances of people surviving 
the cold become even lower. It is estimated that people can stay for 15–30 minutes in such a cold 
sea before exhaustion or unconsciousness.12  
Conditions for rescue operations are very difficult north of Iceland and in the Greenland Sea. Lack of 
infrastructure increases the level of difficulty. There are, for example, no harbours along the east 
coast of Greenland and only a couple of gravel airports. The closest medical services are to be found 
in Iceland. Additionally, telecommunications are very poor in the area. Given the current rescue 
capacity, it would be impossible for the Icelandic Coast Guard to rescue a large number of people 
from a cruise vessel in the area.13 This scenario was, as a matter of fact, the central theme of the 
Arctic Council’s SAREX Greenland Sea in 2013. The exercise centered on a 250 passenger cruise ship 
in distress in the Arctic Sea, northeast of Greenland, within the Search and Rescue Region of Iceland. 
The results of SAREX highlighted the difficulties of large rescue operations in the area. A SAREX follow-
up desk exercise, which took place in October 2014, focused on transporting people from the 
Greenland Sea to Iceland for medical care. In such an event, the civil protection system needs to be 
activated with participation of health authorities and border control.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 
A Committee for the Development of a National Security Policy for Iceland has defined environmental 
threats, sea pollution, or accidents due to increased maritime traffic in the Arctic as key risks for 
Iceland because of its dependence on fisheries.14  The main sailing routes around Iceland are close to 
mayor fish spawning areas and important fishing grounds.  
While the 2007 regulation on sailing routes south and southwest of Iceland decreased, the likelihood 
of severe harmful incidents, such as a pollution accident could have serious, detrimental 
consequences. An oil spill could cause harm in shallow sea or on the coast, with cleaning operations 
                                                                
12 See e.g. http://www.seagrant.umn.edu/coastal_communities/hypothermia  
13 “Risk Assessment for Iceland”. 2009 
14 “Proposal of a Parliamentary Committee for the development of National Security Policy for Iceland”. February 2014. 
Unofficial English translation available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iceland/documents/press_corner/20140324_en.pdf  
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set to be both expensive and time-consuming.15 The main Icelandic harbours are equipped to handle 
oil spill or other forms of sea pollution. In this context, oil tankers do not pose the greatest 
environmental risk in the ocean around Iceland since they do only carry oil and diesel. Crude oil, on 
the other hand, is far more hazardous, and it is on board in most cargo vessels.   
The Icelandic Coast Guard’s vessel Þór (2011) is equipped with a 300 m oil boom and an oil skimmer. 
Before the acquisition of Þór, Iceland did not own any equipment to deal with environmental 
accidents on the open sea. Nonetheless, in the event of a pollution accident within the EEZ of Iceland, 
it could take up to 46 hours for Þór to reach the scene.16 In the event of a large accident, the 
Environment Agency, which is administratively responsible for oil recovery, can request assistance 
from the Nordic countries on grounds of the Copenhagen Agreement 17 and from the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). EMSA has a network of stand-by oil spill response vessels, available 
to assist in oil recovery and pollution prevention operations. Additionally, EMSA provides 
organizational and co-ordination support. While international assistance would be essential for 
Iceland in emergency cases, it could take the vessels a few days to reach the scene, depending on the 
location. Iceland would, therefore, have to rely on the ICG’s Þór.18 
 
4 RISK ASSESSMENT 
The following risk assessment for the Search and Rescue Region of Iceland evaluates the probability 
of different incidents and the level to which each incident can pose risk to people or the environment. 
The assessment is based on written reports of previous incidents and evaluation by experts from the 
Icelandic Coast Guard and the Environment Agency. It is important to note that the assessment is 
based on general estimation and does, therefore, not offer precise prediction of possible incidents in 
the Icelandic SRR. On the other hand, the risk assessment can serve as a basis for further analysis of 
dominating risk factors within the Icelandic Search and Rescue Region. The assessment is done for 
the whole region, as the risk factors are similar. However, given that vessel traffic is at higher level 
                                                                
15 “Progress Report”. 2007, p. 45  
16 “Progress Report”. 2007, p. 77 
17 See http://www.copenhagenagreement.org/  
18 “Progress Report”. 2007, p. 59-61 
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South and Southwest of Iceland, accidents are more likely to take place in that area.  
The possible incidents for the Icelandic SRR have been identified as follows:  
Grounding & mishap refers to an incident where a ship hits land or underwater rocks or when a ship 
capsizes,  
Collision refers to damage due to collision with other vessels or ice,  
Fire/explosion covers any fire or explosion on board,  
Violence/terror refers to terrorism or violence against people at sea,  
Sabotage/vandalism refers to damage done by people on vessels or installations.  
The incidents are further identified with respect to the different types of vessels, as demonstrated in 
table below.  
TABLE 21 POSSIBLE VARIATION OF ACCIDENTS, DEPENDING OF SHIP TYPE AND EVENTS 
 Passenger vessels (incl. 
cruise vessels)  
Cargo/tankers  Fishing vessels  
Grounding & mishap P-G  C-G  F-G  
Collision (incl. ice) P-I  C-I  F-I  
Fire  P-F  C-F  F-F  
Violence/terror  P-V C-V F-V 
Sabotage  P-S  C-S F-S 
 
The risk matrix evaluates the probability of the identified incidents and the possible consequences 
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for a) the environment and b) people (passengers and crew). The risk is considered high if the 
probability of the incident is high and the consequences serious. The red cells indicate high risk, the 
yellow are moderate risk and the green suggest low risk.  
 
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
TABLE 22 RISK MATRIX: PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PART OF THE 
SRR OF ICELAND 
5 – Frequently      
4 – Relatively frequently      
3 – Occurs   F-F F-G, F-I, P-G, C-
F, P-F, 
  
2 – Very rare   C-I, P-I, C-G   
1 – Theoretically possible   F-V, F-S, P-V, 
P-S, C-V, C-S 
  
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious  
Table 22 demonstrates that all the factors pose moderate risk to the environment. The severity is still 
highly dependable on: 1) where the incident happens; 2) if it leads to oil spill or other pollution; 3) 
how much polluting material is on board; and 4) what sort of vessel is involved. Consequences for 
the environment are usually more severe closer to land, where pollution recovery is both difficult and 
time-consuming. The ocean south and southwest of Iceland is also more vulnerable to pollution, as 
it is home to major fish spawning areas.  
All the identified incidents can lead to oil spill. Any incident involving large cargo or cruise vessel – 
which can carry as much oil as an average oil tanker – can pose a great risk to the environment. On 
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the other hand, these vessels are generally well equipped and the crews well trained. The ships that 
have grounded or collided in the sea around Iceland have generally been smaller fishing vessels and 
older cargo ships that are not sailing according to a regular schedule. Large cruise vessels have not 
grounded around Iceland, but there have been incidents with smaller passenger boats. Fire can come 
up in all different vessels and can pose minor to moderate threat to the environment, if it leads to 
explosion or oil spill. No incidents of terrorism have been reported in the Icelandic SRR, but such 
violence remains theoretically possible, mainly for passenger ships or – less likely – cargo vessels. 
Whale hunting boats might be more likely to be a target of vandalism by animal protection activists, 
but such incidents only remain a theoretical possibility. The level of risk would depend on the type of 
terrorism/sabotage. Sabotage could, for example, lead to oil spill and terrorism could involve sinking 
a ship.  
Should an incident involve a large vessel, it is obvious that the consequences could be very severe for 
the environment. But in general, the likelihood of such an incident is not very high, which explains 
why most risk factors are considered moderate in this matrix.  
 
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE  
 
TABLE 23 RISK MATRIX: PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES IN THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PART OF THE SRR OF ICELAND 
5 – Frequently      
4 – Relatively frequently      
3 – Occurs     F-G, F-I, F-F, 
C-F, P-G, 
 P-F 
2 – Very rare    C-G, C-I, P-I,  
1 – Theoretically possible    F-S, C-S, P-S F-V, C-V, P-V 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious  
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Table 23 shows that all different incidents may have significant or serious consequences for human 
lives.  The potential for each incident is the same as in table 2, but the risk to human lives is different 
than to the environment. The level of risk for each incident would depend greatly on: 1) where the 
incident happens; 2) how many people are on board; 3) the training of the crew; 4) weather 
conditions and sea temperature; and 5) available life-saving equipment. Extreme weather can make 
rescue operations very difficult and even pose risk to the lives of rescue people. Such operations may 
also be more time-consuming farther from land and, therefore, pose greater threats to human lives.  
Fire can be particularly dangerous on passenger ships, as there are more people on board. The larger 
cruise vessels would, on the other hand, be better equipped to deal with outbreaks of fire. In any 
case of grounding or collision of large cruise vessels, rescue operations could prove to be very 
difficult. However, the likelihood of such incidents remains low.  
Terrorism would always pose great risk to human lives. Sabotage could also threaten people’s lives, 
but depending on what kind of sabotage or vandalism it would be. 
 
NEW CHALLENGES  
While improved technology has simplified surveillance and rescue operations, the preparedness 
system has also been faced with new challenges. As noted, the intervention authorization of the ICG 
and the Environment Agency were strengthened after the case of Vikartindur, where the vessel’s 
captain refused assistance until it was too late to prevent grounding. This legal right was, for example, 
exercised in the case of the grounding of Green Freezer in 2014. The owner’s original plans, to use a 
tugboat to refloat the vessel, proved to be unrealistic.  
The case of Fernanda has raised additional questions about the legal issues, underpinning rescue 
operations. The ship was registered in the Commonwealth of Dominica and insured in Russia. The 
ship company, which owned Fernanda, was registered in Estonia, but it was operating for an Icelandic 
ship company. Additionally, the crew was of different nationalities and none of them from Estonia or 
Dominica. During the rescue operation, it proved difficult to get hold of the ship’s owners and/or the 
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insurance company. The insurance company subsequently refused to pay for the operation, claiming 
it was unnecessary to tow the ship away from the original place where it caught fire. The ICG started 
legal proceedings, which resulted in a settlement where the costs of the ICG were fully covered. 
The increased activities of private, marine salvage companies, has raised additional questions. 
Contracted (or looking to be contracted) by insurance companies or ship owners, the salvagers want 
to overtake operational management on scene.  Three different actors, it turned out, were preparing 
to take control of operations around the grounding of Akrafell in 2014. While some salvage 
companies are experienced in different marine conditions, it can take time for them to arrive with 
the necessary equipment and to provide realistic plans. This again can create conflicts concerning 
operational management as well as disputes on the salvage award.  
The increasing international nature of the shipping industry provides challenges for local authorities. 
Operating in a somewhat new landscape, both the ICG and the Environment Agency emphasize the 
need for additional capacities and resources to guarantee full refund of any operations related to 
pollution prevention and oil recovery. In any case, the intervention authority of governmental 
institutions is essential to be able to take control on scene and prevent marine pollution. 
 
SUMMARY  
The Icelandic preparedness system and its response mechanisms do not face major problems. The 
agencies involved in Search and Rescue have sought to draw lessons from previous incidents in the 
sea around Iceland and from regional exercises as part of their efforts to strengthen their capacity to 
deal with different contingencies. The risk factors for maritime activity remain the same. But owing 
to better vessels, security equipment, improved technology, and safety and surveillance training, the 
preparedness system is more capable of responding to life threatening incidents than before. The 
Icelandic Coast Guard has, however, not been able to realize the full potential of its resources due to 
budgetary restrains, a development that can affect its surveillance function and increase response 
time in case of accidents.  
Meanwhile, new trends in the international shipping industry have created new challenges, 
particularly with respect to administering pollution prevention and salvage operations. Key 
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governmental institutions still lack the power to take all measures considered necessary to prevent 
marine pollution and to assure full refund of the salvage operations.  
Given the enormous size of the Icelandic Search and Rescue Region, Iceland would always need to 
rely up on international assistance in the event of large accidents. Rescue actors, as well as ship 
companies, need to be familiar with the difficult marine conditions in the sea around Iceland, 
particularly north of the country and east of Greenland where infrastructure is limited. Regional 
exercises and operational cooperation are essential to guarantee the most professional response to 
any regional incidents.   
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PART IV   MARITIME ACTIVITY RISK PATTERNS AND TYPES OF UNWANTED 
INCIDENTS. THE GREENLANDIC SEA AREAS  BY UFFE JAKOBSEN AND BOLETTE KERN 
The MARPART project studies the time period from 2015 to 2025, which means considerations 
concerning e.g. off-shore installations and which sea routes will be accessible in 2025. Such 
developments are, of course, very hard to predict, especially because the nature in the Arctic is very 
unpredictable. Already in 2007, the European Space Agency announced that the Northwest Passage 
for the first time was open to traffic. According to UN’s IPCC's fourth evaluation report the Northwest 
Passage will continue to be free of ice during summer season the next decades (Stuer-Lauridsen & 
Overgaard, 2013; p. 38). Meanwhile, before 2025 there is no expected increase in container or cargo 
vessels sailing through the Northwest Passage due to season changes, ice blocking, insufficient 
nautical charts and limited draught (Stuer-Lauridsen & Overgaard, 2013; p. 39).  
An estimate of maritime activity is also hard to make. In the case of Greenland the coastal maritime 
traffic is serving a small population and a small industry which is neither expected to grow significantly 
the coming years, nor the maritime traffic is expected to increase. There have been and will be test 
drillings for oil and minerals, but none of these projects are sufficiently large to predict an increase in 
the maritime activity. At the moment the only active mine in Greenland is the ruby mine in 
Aappaluttoq near Qeqertarsuatsiaat on the Greenlandic midwest coast, which is a relatively small 
mine. Also at the moment a public consultation is in process for the Ironbark application concerning 
the exploitation of the zinc/lead deposits at the Citronen Fjord in North Greenland National Park. In 
the Environmental Impact Assessment report Ironbark has assessed that shipping according to this 
project will not have impact on the environment, since shipping is done outside the breeding season 
of ringed seal, and the low frequency of maritime journeys expected in the three months window 
(Naalakkersuisut, 2015).  
In the MARPART project Report 1: Maritime Activity in the High North – Current and Estimated Level 
up to 2025 we have highlighted that Greenland’s size and location in the Arctic are causing some 
challenging circumstances when it comes to maritime activity. Greenland’s territorially large area 
covers both a large land and sea area, and hereby also an extensive coastline. Around 85 per cent of 
Greenland is covered with permanent ice, and the weather is heavy and unstable and often 
unpredictable. The coastal waters of Greenland are partly ice covered or marked by icebergs and 
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pack ice. Greenland is sparsely populated and the population is living scattered on the remaining 15 
per cent of the island not covered by ice. Due to the large distances, dispersed population, rough 
geography and harsh climate infrastructure is only available in the populated areas. This means that 
few harbours, heliports and airports are placed along the very extensive coastline.  
Climate changes have induced possibilities in the Greenlandic waters that already have, and in the 
future will have, large influence on the maritime activity and traffic in Greenland. More traffic is due 
to longer sailings seasons, which affects all maritime vessels, but not least fishing vessels. Offshore 
oil and gas as well as mining industries will lead to an increase in maritime activity and traffic. 
Greenland is already seeing an increase in the number of cruise ships as Greenland and the Arctic 
have become a desired tourist attraction in general and especially a destination for large cruise ships.  
The increase in the maritime activity that Greenland already has experienced and is expecting in the 
future is generating risk factors for potential unwanted incidents when considering the special 
circumstances present in the Arctic and Greenlandic nature.  
1 DOMINATING RISK FACTORS   
On the basis of the conclusions from Report 1: Maritime Activity in the High North – Current and 
Estimated Level up to 2025 four potential threatening situations is selected for further examination 
and analysis in this report. Grounding is a dominating risk factor due to the very extensive Greenlandic 
coastline with many underwater reefs and comprehensive skerries. Also the presence of ice in the 
Greenlandic waters is a risk factor due to ships' collision with the ice. These two potential threatening 
situations are intensified and complicated by the position of a potential accident and the 
characteristics of its surroundings. The Arctic and Greenlandic nature and climate entail surroundings 
that are unpredictable and unstable often in form of heavy weather and ice, which complicate search 
and rescue operations and environmental control. Also the position of a potential accident is a 
dominating risk factor due to the much dispersed infrastructure. Most of the airports and heliports 
are centered close to the most populated areas on the southwest and midwest coast of Greenland; 
this creates a risk factor for those ships operating far away from the west coast in remote and isolated 
areas. Due to the increased focus on the expected presence of minerals in the Greenlandic subsoil 
and the oil and gas deposits of shore Greenland, both environmental activists and wildlife activists 
have been more present in Arctic and the Greenlandic waters. This increase constitutes a risk of 
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violence and even terror against mineral or oil companies. These four threatening factors are 
composed of the most dominating risk factors to maritime activity and traffic in Greenland, and they 
will be analysed in the next sections.   
 
 2 ACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS  
The section below presents only the number of search and rescue operations, partly because until 
august 2015 no known oil spill or pollution in general has taken place in Greenlandic waters, and 
partly because there have not yet been made estimations on the environmental risk.  
 
SEARCH AND RESCUE  
In case of an incident in Greenlandic waters, that requires search and rescue (SAR), these operations 
are provided by several actors. The responsibility for SAR operations is divided between the 
Greenland Police, which is a Danish institution, who are handling SAR operations within a zone of 3 
nautical miles from the coast, and the Danish Defence's Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) that 
is handling SAR operations in an area between the 3 nautical miles line from the coast to the outer 
limit of Greenland’s area of SAR responsibility, according to the SAR agreement made under the 
auspices of the Arctic Council in 2011, see figure 9. 
90 
 
 
FIGURE 9 KINGDOM OF DENMARK'S SAR DELIMITATION (SOURCE: ARCTIC PORTAL LIBRARY) 
A large part of the SAR operations is conducted in cooperation between the Greenland Police and 
JRCC. JRCC is furthermore responsible for ships reporting to the GREENPOS system, no matter where 
the ships will be within Greenland’s area of SAR responsibility. JRCC is a cooperation between two 
actors: the Joint Arctic Commando (JAC) which surveys the maritime traffic and Naviair that observes 
the air traffic.  
Every year the Operative Kontaktgruppe Arktis (OKA) completes a report on all SAR operations in 
Greenland, both local SAR operation conducted by the police and those conducted by the JRCC. This 
report is used here as a source to describe the probability of accidents in Greenlandic waters.  
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TABLE 24 NUMBER OF SAR OPERATIONS 2009-2014 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
SAR sea 27 60 82 84 95 75 
SAR land 2 4 5 21 22 20 
SAR air 3 1 1 1 3 2 
Total 32 65 88 106 120 97 
 
SAR operations include all incidents from distressed vessels, airplanes and persons in water or on 
land. SAR operations on land are most often hunters in trouble, but also expeditions on the ice cap, 
mountaineers or other events. A SAR operation concerning air includes destitute persons and 
emergency landing.  
First, the number of SAR operations must be compared to the number of journeys and not the 
number of vessels, since a SAR operation is tied to the individual journey and not the individual vessel. 
Second, the number of journeys is not estimated. This is probably because the number of vessels and 
their journeys in Greenland is based on registrations in GREENPOS, which only constitute the 
reported number of ships. In general, these are vessels under 30 feet that not, or very rarely, register 
in GREENPOS (Joint Arctic Command, 2015: 9).  
 
TABLE 25 NUMBER OF PERSONS IN DISTRESS 2009-2014 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Persons  71 199 233 263 348 223 
Missing  1 8 3 0 6 5 
Perished 3 2 0 3 2 10 
Rescue percentage 94,4 95 98,7 98,8 97,7 93,3 
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According to the aims of Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd the rescue percentage should be 94 
percent and over, which is fulfilled in all years but 2014. The lower rescue percentage in 2014 is due 
to especially two lager incidents in 2014, with a larger number of perished persons19. It should be 
emphasised that the aim of an a rescue percentage of 94 percent is not an indication of an acceptance 
of the loss of up to 6 persons out of every, but an indication that a rescue percentage of 100 percent 
is unrealistic. Sometime people deliberately don’t want to be rescued (Joint Arctic Command, 2015; 
6).  
 
TABLE 26 TYPE OF MARINE VESSELS IN SAR OPERATIONS 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Maritime vessel under 30 feet 
Dinghy/motor boat 18 40 65 49 70 64 
Sailing ship 0 0 0 0 5 1 
Kayaks 0 2 0 0 0 1 
Other 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Maritime vessel over 30 feet 
Motor boat 0 0 2 12 1 0 
Cargo vessel 0 2 1 3 0 0 
Tugs 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sailing ship 1 4 2 2 6 1 
Fishing vessel 3 7 4 16 2 2 
Tanker 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
19 In august 2014 four people perished in an accident in the Disco Bay area.  Also, in July 2015 three people perished 
close to Uummannaq.   
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Marine vessels under 30 feet constitute the largest number of SAR operations, especially dinghies 
and small motor boats account for most SAR operations. JSCC Greenland has experienced in the 
recent years that the many incidents with small boats under 30 feet are due to an increase in prices 
on traffic traveling by air plane or ship, why people take the chance and sail by them self to various 
destinations on the coast (Joint Arctic Command, 2015: 8). Insufficient information on where people 
travel by boat, on when they expect to be back plus poor equipment and bad motor maintenance led 
to a campaign up to the sailing season 2014 with focus on informing on the necessity of a check-up 
on the motor ahead of sailing trips. Earlier SAR service has had success with reminding sailors to 
remember sufficient fuel for the whole trip and coloured tape that easily can be seen by the SAR 
service (Joint Arctic Command, 2015: 8).  
 
TABLE 27 AREA FOR SAR OPERATIONS AND NUMBER OF INCIDENTS 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
East Greenland 4 9 10 13 16 10 
Southwest Greenland  16 26 34 47 41 34 
Midwest Greenland 7 15 19 19 27 34 
The Disco Bay area 5 6 18 16 24 10 
Northwest Greenland 9 9 7 11 12 9 
Most of the SAR incidents are occurring on the west coast of Greenland, and especially southwest 
Greenland. This is due to the location of several towns on the west coast compared to the two on the 
east coast. Much of the maritime activity and traffic is going on in between towns on the west coast.  
To sum up, dinghies and small motor boats under 30 feet most likely owned by individuals and self-
employed fishermen are the most common vessel types in the Greenlandic waters and also that type 
of vessel which accounts for most SAR operations. The largest part of SAR operations to marine 
vessels over 30 feet is concerning fishing vessels and larger motor boats, whereas cargo vessels, tugs, 
sailing ships and tankers rarely need help from SAR operations.  
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CRUISE SHIPS 
There has not been any accidents involving larger cruise ships in Greenlandic waters, and this type of 
ship are therefore not represented in OKA’s report on SAR operations in Greenland. The number of 
cruise ships sailing in Greenlandic waters has increased since 2009, and in 2014 92 cruise ships sailed 
in Greenlandic waters (MARPART Report 1, p. 20). The number of passengers has fallen from 26.976 
in 2009 to 20.216 in 2014, because less high-capacity ships with over one thousand passengers are 
cruising Greenlandic waters, whereas several smaller cruise ships with 200-500 passengers more 
often are sailing in Greenlandic waters.  
We can make no estimate on how likely it is that a cruise ship will end up in an accident and in need 
of help, but cruise ships are very present in the Greenlandic waters, and probably will be more 
present in the future, and considering the large number of passengers despite the fall in the number 
of passengers, an accident could be fatal.  
POLLUTION RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS 
First, it should be emphasized that until august 2015 there has not been any known oil spill or other 
environmental pollution. In august 2015 an oil spill on the Greenlandic east coast was observed by 
the Joint Arctic Command. This accident is further described below in this section.  
Table 4 tells that most SAR operations and accidents happen on the west coast of Greenland, 
especially Southwest and Midwest Greenland and in the Disco Bay area. In these areas the level of 
maritime traffic is higher than in the rest of Greenland, and the traffic routes in the region are located 
close to shore. The more traffic the greater the risk of accidents and the need of SAR operations 
or/and risk of environmental pollution response, so the west coast of Greenland, and especially the 
areas around the larger towns, is estimated to be in greater risk of oil spill or other forms of 
environmental pollution.   
The Greenlandic institutions for preparedness to oil spill response is the company Greenland Oil Spill 
Response (GOSR), owned by the Government of Greenland, which is operating from Nuuk and 
Aasiaat. GOSR is in control of quite a large amount of equipment for handling oil spill, e.g. different 
oil boomers for harbours, open water and beaches and oil skimmers (www.gosr.gl). GOSR’s 
equipment can handle quite a serious oil spill. In 2014 GOSR’s response equipment was moved from 
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the airport area in Kangerlussuaq to the harbour areas in the towns of Nuuk and Aasiaat in order to 
ensure a better coverage of the whole country and faster mobilisation by sea (Greenland Oil Spill 
Response, 2015: 5). Even though the response equipment is available in Nuuk and in Aassiat there is 
still a question on how fast the equipment can arrive at a possible waste site. In 2015 The Joint Arctic 
Command registered an oil spill on the east coast of Greenland, and sent a ship to investigate the oil 
spill. Due to the large distance from the location of the ship to the location of the presumed oil spill 
pollution and due to bad weather the ship reached the oil spill five days after the oil spill was first 
observed via satellite images, an amount of time that has been criticised by Greenpeace, who criticise 
the Greenlandic preparedness for not being efficient (Greenpeace, 2015). In general the National 
Audit Office of Denmark criticizes the Danish Defence for not prioritizing surveillance of the 
Greenlandic marine environment, lacking assessment of the environmental risk and legislative 
enforcement in the area (Rigsrevisionen, 2013: 25).   
On the basis of the criticism from the National Audit Office of Denmark and expected increase in the 
maritime activity and traffic in Greenland, it was agreed in the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 
that a risk assessment should be prepared for the marine environment in and around Greenland. The 
risk assessment must contribute to the assessment work concerning the Danish Defence’s 
consolidation of assignments in the Arctic (Danish Defense Agreement 2013-2017). The report on the 
environmental risk assessment in Greenland will make estimations on the combination of the vessel 
traffic data, historical accidents data and estimation on the likely spill volumes.  
GEUS – Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland – has in very rich detail described exactly which 
area in Greenland there is most sensitive to oil spill, not only concerning the wildlife like seabirds, fish 
and marine mammal, but also concerning popular areas for hunting and archeological important 
locations (GEUS 2011, 2012). This detailed mapping of the sensitivity of the Greenlandic coast is done 
out of consideration of some of the special conditions in the Greenlandic nature which will have an 
effect on a potential oil spill. Pollution of oil in the sea can affect greater areas and more living 
resources far away from the waste site, while pollution of oil on land easier can be reduced to a 
smaller area (Mosbech, 2002: 9). The low temperatures, the seasonal darkness, the ice and the 
restricted infrastructure induce that the effects of an oil spill must be expected to last longer in 
Greenland then in countries on a lover latitude (Mosbech, 2002: 10).   
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3 CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT INCIDENTS  
GROUNDING 
Grounding is the most frequent reason for accidents at sea in Greenland (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2015: 4), 
often because of the many underwater reefs that are located all around the Greenlandic coastline. 
Due to the extensive coastline and comprehensive skerries, many areas along the Greenlandic 
coastline are not systematically, coherent and adequate measured and transferred to nautical charts. 
Some areas can even be considered uncharted. The problem is especially widespread on the east 
coast. Radar and sonar can be used, but are not in all situations sufficient e.g. with high speed or 
under heavy wind or stream (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008: 9).    
Danish Maritime Authorities' report on accidents from 2015 show the number of accidents in 
Greenlandic waters in the period from 2010 to 2014 and type of accident (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2015; 5). 
As mentioned, grounding is the most frequent type of accidents.  
TABLE 28 NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS IN GREENLANDIC WATERS DIVIDED BY TYPE OF ACCIDENT 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Collision or contact damage 3 1 0 0 0 
Damage on ship or equipment 0 0 1 0 0 
Fire/explosion 0 0 0 1 1 
Water ingress incl. sink 0 0 1 0 0 
Grounding 3 4 6 1 3 
Control failure 0 1 0 0 0 
 
It is noted in the Danish Maritime Authorities' report that presumably not all sea accidents in 
Greenlandic waters are reported (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2015: 5).  
In 2006 one of The Danish Maritime Authorities' own ships, doing measurement for nautical charts, 
first grounded and later sank in the Arsuk fjord in the southern Greenland. This ship was provided 
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with equipment to locate underwater reefs, and it is therefore very indicative when a ship like this, 
ground and sink. Before the attempt to salvage the grounded vessel, the vessel had been drain from 
oil, so no pollution was done (Danish Naval History). To navigate in Greenlandic waters is apparently 
challenging even with a lot of equipment.  
Due to the many underwater skerries along the Greenlandic coast grounding is occurring for all type 
of ships. The risk of human lives is estimated to be moderate. It is possible that sharp reefs can cut 
up the hull of the vessel and water can ingress, but the vessel is on firm ground and huge water 
ingress is necessary if the vessel should overturn and downright sink. Also sailing in the difficult 
Greenlandic waters is most often done with the use of either local or qualified navigators that have 
experience with sailing in arctic waters (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2006; 27) and most often recommended 
routes are followed by vessels, as recommended routes are acknowledged among navigators as being 
reliable area to navigate (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008; 3). Using qualified navigators and following 
recommended routes is though not always enough to avoid grounding in the difficult Greenlandic 
waters. Both in 2010 and 2012 the passenger vessel Sarfaq Ittuk that sails along the west coast 
grounded - in 2010 close to Napasoq south of Maniitsoq and in 2012 in the harbour of Qaqortoq. 
Thus, not even for vessels that often navigate in these waters and with an experienced crew is it 
possible to avoid the difficult skerries.      
The risk of grounding is also due to that the reef can cut up the hull of the vessel and oil or diesel can 
leak. This risk is greatest in the case of vessels carrying a large amount of oil or diesel, that is tankers, 
cargo vessels, intercontinental traffic, cruise and passenger vessels. If one of these types of vessels is 
grounding the risk for the environment is larger than e.g. smaller motor boats and fishing vessels. The 
risk is also higher for cruise ships and passenger traffic, as these vessels are sailing close to shore for 
the satisfaction of their cruise guests and passengers, compared to intercontinental traffic and cargo 
vessels which are sailing far from the shore.  
COLLISION 
From table 26 it is seen that collision or contact damage is occurring rather rare. Collision in 
Greenlandic waters can either be collision with ice or collision with another vessel; this is though less 
probable because of the relatively low ship activity and traffic in Greenland due to the small 
population, small export/import and absence of international transit routes. Collision was none the 
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less the theme of a tactical exercise between the different actors in the Greenlandic emergency 
organisation in 2014, when the scenario was a collision between a cargo vessel and a cruise ship 
(Forsvaret, u.å. a). 
A collision with ice is a more frequent risk in the Greenlandic waters. Ice formations occur in all water 
around Greenland during winter, and sea ice is present all year round in varying quantity.  The 
prevalence of drifting ice depends on the season, but can within same month change a great deal 
from one year to another, which makes it almost impossible to predict the ice situation. The large 
drop in temperature due to an area with a lot of ice is often causing fog, which makes it even more 
difficult to navigate in icy waters (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008: 10). At last the massive icebergs coming 
from the northeast area and moving along the east coast, are in constant movement and can in no 
time block very big areas and close up fjord outlets (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008: 27).  
In 2012 the containership Vega Sagittarius grounded shortly after taking off from Nuuk. The accident 
happened in trying to avoid collision with ice but the change of direction led to the grounding on an 
underwater reef. The following report on the accident concluded that error in human decision-
making caused the accident. Furthermore, the report criticised that profound precaution due to 
navigation in Greenlandic waters was not followed (Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 
2013). The example with Vega Sagittarius exemplifies under what difficult conditions ships is 
manoeuvring when sailing in Greenland. 
The level of risk of collision in Greenlandic waters is rather low, which must result from great caution 
and the noticing of advices from e.g. The Danish Meteorological Institute ice charts. The 
consequences of collision and the risk of human lives are estimated to a minimum because most 
vessels use navigators that have great experience in sailing arctic waters, so called ice navigators that 
are qualified to navigate in icy waters. Use of a local and qualified navigator allow for better safety. 
This is emphasised by Greenlandic navigators reporting on the missing knowledge about navigating 
in icy waters among foreign captains. It is hard for inexperienced captains to understand all the risk 
connected to navigating in icy waters (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2006; 27).  
Environmental risk assessment and consequences are estimated to less when considering fishing 
vessels and smaller boats. First these vessels are often sailed with local knowledge and experience, 
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and these vessels carry a smaller amount of oil or diesel so the environmental damage will be less in 
case of an accident. Considering cargo vessels, intercontinental traffic and cruise ships the 
environmental risk is estimated to moderate because these types of vessels carry more oil or diesel 
and the spill can be that much bigger. Also these vessels are often sailed by inexperienced captains, 
and especially cruise ships sail close to ice bergs and glaciers to give their guest a unique experience.      
POSITION AND SURROUNDINGS  
CRUISE SHIPS 
The position and the surroundings of an accident can have serious consequences for both human 
lives and the environment. Most cruise ships are present in the waters Southwest and Midwest of 
Greenland (Visit Greenland), but more travel companies offer cruises to some of the most remote 
areas in Greenland, as high north up on the east coast as waters around Svalbard, on the west coast 
further north than Thule Airbase and even special expedition cruises plan routes all the way around 
Greenland.  
 
 
  
SOURCE: WWW.EXPEDICTIONS.COM  
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SOURCE: WWW.QUARKEXPEDITION.COM 
FIGURE 10 MAPS SHOWING THE MORE REMOTE AND ISOLATED ROUTES THAT SOME CRUISES TAKE IN GREENLAND 
 
Due to the much dispersed infrastructure the position of cruise ship in such remote and isolated areas 
constitute a serious risk to human lives if severe accidents or illness occur, because of the long 
distance to the nearest harbour, heliport or medical service. Also in case of an accident, the arctic 
climate and nature in these remote areas, in form of low temperatures and cold water, fast changing 
and sometimes very heavy weather create risk of human lives in situations where it is necessary to 
remove the passengers. According to the Danish Maritime Authorities cruise traffic in very remote 
and isolated areas is a result of travel companies offering the unique cruise, which is the reason why 
the cruises often take place on the east coast and also in the fjords (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008; 21).  
SAREX AND ARCTIC RESPONSE: 
An accident involving a cruise ship in one of these very remote areas has never occurred but the 
Greenlandic SAR preparedness has had training exercises that dealt with exactly such a scenario. In 
the fall of 2012 and 2013 two SAR exercises has been conducted by the Kingdom of Denmark in the 
Greenlandic waters with people involved from many different organisations in the Arctic states. Both 
years the scenario was centered on a cruise ship in distress on the northeast coast of Greenland 
necessitating a large and complex SAR operation. The two exercises were very realistic in case of 
meteorological, geography, borders, infrastructure, political and economic conditions etc. The only 
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thing not realistic was that all capacities had to be pre-positioned prior to the exercise. From the SAR 
exercises in 2012 to 2013 the SAREX exercise was extended to include also maritime pollution (SAREX 
Greenland Sea, 2013: 6-7). Gaining experience in cooperation among the stakeholders was a key 
priority, and for this reason alone, the exercise can be described as a success (SAREX Greenland Sea, 
2012: 6, SAREX Greenland Sea, 2013: 6). 
The evaluations in general emphasise the participating organisations were able to coordinate in a 
remote area and overcome initial communication problems. That said, the evaluation also points to 
inadequate means of communication, especially long-range communications from the remote 
incident to the Rescue Coordination Centre and higher authorities, insufficient information both 
horizontally and vertically, absence of a common situation picture, a need for more robust command 
and control at the operational and cross-organisational, as opposed to the tactical, level and a need 
for a shared system or registry of available SAR resources (SAREX Greenland Sea, 2012; 6), the need 
for an Air Task Organisation for handling a large number of aircrafts, a formal SAR cooperation 
agreement between the national coordination forums at the strategic level in Denmark/Greenland 
and Iceland, and a plan for maritime pollution equipment (SAREX Greenland Sea 2013: 6). Most of 
the criticism in the evaluation can be met through more of these training exercises. Some of the 
critics point to the need of a more constant coordination and the formation of new cooperation 
organisations. The biggest challenge is to improve the technical communication problems in the 
remote arctic area.  
Due to more activity in the Arctic region the present defence agreement have among other things established 
the Arctic Emergency Force (Arktisk Beredskabsstyrke) which in September 2015 held a military defence 
exercise in Greenland where some of the tasks were SAR and damning of maritime pollution (Forsvaret for 
Danmark, u.å. b). The evaluation of Arctic Response exercise has not yet been published but both 
communication equipment and satellite monitoring has been requested based on this military exercise.   
The risk of human lives in case of a cruise ship in distress is estimated to theoretically possible. Since cruise 
ships area sailing in remote and isolated areas, the consequences of such an accident is estimated to serious 
due to the dispersed infrastructure and the intense arctic climate and nature.  
The risk for the environment is also estimated to serious, due to two reasons. First the remote position is 
causing a risk in case of an oil spill, because it will take long time for GOSR to arrive at the waste site, and the 
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oil spill can dissipate in the meantime. Second it is expected that cruise ships are sailing to these remote areas 
to experience a lot of ice, the presence of the ice can complicate the effort to prevent the oil in dissipating, 
and so can heavy weather.    
OTHER MARITIME TRAFFIC 
Cargo vessels is most often sailing on the west coast and in between towns, which are in reach from 
the harbours, heliports, medical service and the pollution response available on the west coast. Even 
though the distance between the towns and settlements can be far from the nearest harbour or 
heliport, these ships often use qualified navigators (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008; 27) and follow 
recommended routes (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2006: 3). The risk for human lives and the environment is 
therefore estimated to moderate.  
As described above in table 3 it is most often the smaller boats that are in need of help or SAR 
operations. The dinghies and small motor boats is most likely used for fishing and owned by self-
employed fishermen or hunters. Because of an estimated smaller economy in these ownerships, the 
condition of these dinghies and small motor boats is questionable. A technical risk is present if the 
boats are old and worn out, which also creates a risk to the lives of the fishermen or hunters. That 
said, these small fishing vessels are often manoeuvred by the most experienced navigators that also 
know the localities very well, and the vessels are operating within reach from the coast. Accidents for 
vessels used for fishing is occurring more often than cargo vessels, but still the consequences are 
estimated to be moderate. The risk of the environment is also estimated to moderate since the fishing 
vessels are most often in operation on the west coast closer to the pollution response and they are 
often carrying only a small amount of oil or diesel. 
VIOLENCE AND TERROR 
Incidents of violence means violent behaviour towards persons or/and physical installations. The 
development of oil and gas activity in Greenland may increase the presence of environmental 
activism. Greenpeace is present in Greenland both to preserve the environment and Arctic wildlife. 
Latest Greenpeace sailed in the Greenlandic waters was in August 2015 to draw attention to the 
seismic sound wave measurement for oil explorations taking place in northeast Greenland. 
Greenpeace criticises the measurement for being a threat to the area's marine mammals. In 2011 
Greenpeace performed an action against offshore installation performing test drillings for oil west of 
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the Disco Island. Later Greenpeace Denmark and Greenpeace International has been sentenced to 
pay a large fine due to their three occupations of the offshore installation, where one of the actions 
composed a risk with regard to safety.  
Greenpeace is present in Greenlandic waters and does from time to time perform actions, but since 
it is a principle of Greenpeace actions not to do violent but direct action, the risk of human lives is 
estimated as insignificant to all types of vessels. Also since Greenpeace foundation is to protect the 
environment, the risk to the environment is estimated as insignificant for all types of vessels.  
 
4 RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
TABLE 29 POSSIBLE VARIATIONS OF ACCIDENTS DEPENDING ON TYPES OF VESSELS AND EVENTS 
 Tourist/cruise ship Cargo/tanker/tug/intercontinental 
transport/passenger 
transport/petroleum 
activities/research 
Fisheries 
Grounding T-G C-G F-G 
Collision T-C C-C F-C 
Position/surroundings T-P C-P F-P 
Violence/terror T-V C-V F-V 
 
Grounding is the accident most often occurring in Greenlandic waters due to the many underwater 
reefs and skerries. Still the risk of human lives are estimated to moderate for all types of vessels due 
to the often use of navigators with local knowledge and following the recommended routes. The risk 
of the environment due to grounding is estimated to moderate for tourist/cruise ships and for cargo 
vessels, tankers, tugs, international transport, passenger transport, petroleum activities and research 
vessels due to the larger amount of oil or diesels these types are carrying compared to fishing vessels 
and smaller motor boats.  
104 
 
The collision with ice or other vessels is occurring rather rare and the risks of human lives are 
estimated to minor due to the often use of navigators with great experience when sailing in icy 
waters. The estimated level of environmental risk for fishing vessels or smaller motor boats is lower 
since these types of vessels are carrying less oil or diesel compared to larger types of vessels. The 
environmental risk for tourist/cruise ships and for cargo vessels, tankers, tugs, international 
transport, passenger transport, petroleum activities and research vessels is estimated to moderate 
due to the larger amount of oil or diesel, and also some of these ships are sailed by inexperienced 
crew, and especially cruise ships sail close to the ice.    
The position and the surroundings for a potential accident can be significant, not least for the tourist 
and cruise ships that sail in remote and isolated areas. The risk of human lives and the environment 
for tourist and cruise ships is estimated to significant even though no such accidents has happened 
in Greenlandic waters. The significant risk is due to the dispersed infrastructure that complicates both 
a SAR operation and environmental control, also the surroundings in form of the unpredictable and 
unstable arctic nature is complicating both SAR operations and environmental control. Considering 
cargo vessels, tankers, tugs, international transport, passenger transport, petroleum activities and 
research vessels the risk of an accident in a position far from the nearest harbour, heliport, medical 
service or environmental response is estimated to occurring very rare and the consequences to be 
moderate due to the often use of qualified and Greenlandic navigators. Accidents are occurring more 
often to fishing vessels and smaller motor boats but because the experienced fishermen with local 
knowledge, and because the vessel are operating within reach from the coast, the risk of human lives 
is estimated to only moderate. The risk of the environment is also estimated to moderate due to the 
smaller amount of oil and diesel fishing vessels and smaller motor boats are carrying.  
Due to the low level of activism in Greenland against maritime activities like e.g. search for oil the risk 
of violence and/or terror to human lives and to the environment is estimated to insignificant.    
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TABLE 30 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR HUMAN LIVES 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious 
5 – Frequently      
4 – Relatively frequently      
3 – Occurs    T-G, C-G,  
F-G, F-P 
  
2 – Very rare T-V, C-V,  
F-V 
T-C, C-C,  
F-C 
C-P   
1 – Theoretically possible     T-P 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious  
 
TABLE 31 RISK MATRIX OF CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious 
5 – Frequently      
4 – Relatively frequently      
3 – Occurs   F-G T-G ,C-G, F-P   
2 – Very rare T-V, C-V,  
F-V 
F-C T-C, C-C, C-P   
1 – Theoretically possible     T-P 
 Insignificant Minor Moderate Significant Serious  
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SUMMARY 
As it is shown in the sections above, the types of vessels most often in distress and in need of SAR 
operations are dinghies, smaller motor boats and fishing vessels. These types of vessels are not 
creating the largest risk for either human lives or the environment, since these type of vessels are 
not transporting a lot of passengers or carrying a lot of diesel or oil. The Greenlandic emergency 
prevention, preparedness and response needs however also to be able to handle larger emergency 
situations. Since 2009 the number of cruises in Greenlandic waters has risen 14 percent and there is 
an expectation of more maritime traffic and activity in the Greenlandic waters due to the effect of 
climate change with longer sailing seasons and wider sailing possibilities. The Greenlandic emergency 
response needs therefore the resources and capacity to handle smaller SAR operations to e.g. smaller 
vessels but larger operations will not only require the Greenlandic SAR preparedness and OSR 
resources and capacity but also assistance from Denmark and probably Canada or Iceland, as well, 
depending on the position and the size of a potential accident.  
The largest challenge for the current SAR service and pollution response in Greenland is the 
enormous sea and land area that is within Greenland’s responsibility area and those challenges given 
by the natural conditions present in this part of the Arctic including the relative dispersed 
infrastructure which does not render a fast and efficient emergency response in all areas of 
Greenland. The worst possible accident is a large cruise ship in distress in a remote and isolated area 
on the north or northeast coast of Greenland with many thousand passengers and a large amount of 
diesel or oil onboard. The solution to such a risk is a costly expansion of the infrastructure in these 
remote and isolated areas or improved measurement of popular destinations, which is also 
associated with large expenditures (Søfartsstyrelsen, 2008; 21) or a change of the organization and 
division of responsibilities concerning SAR and OSR resources and capacities.  
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CONCLUSION: MARITIME ACTIVITY RISK PATTERNS IN THE HIGH NORTH      
BY NATALIA ANDREASSEN AND ODD JARL BORCH 
 
This report analyzes current commercial and governmental activity in sea regions north of the 
Polar Circle from the Kara Sea to the Baffin Bay. It includes an overview of dominating risk 
factors, types and probability of unwanted incidents and consequences of different incidents. 
The report takes into account the estimated increase in some types of maritime activity in the 
High North and analyses major accidents that may have implications on the risk assessments. 
The report also provides risk assessments across the studied territories of the Arctic countries 
Russia, Norway, Greenland and Iceland. 
For all countries, the main risk factors include severe and unpredictable climatic conditions, 
expansion of operational range for many categories of vessels into areas with limited or no 
infrastructure, distance to emergency preparedness resources, technical limitations as to both 
vessel and equipment in cold climate areas, and human factors like lack in experience, 
navigational competence and crew fatigue. In Russia, human factors prevail as the main reason 
for most accidents. Norway especially highlights seasonal changes especially during winter 
months and poorly charted waters especially in the areas remote from the mainland. Iceland 
has listed the same risk factors, and mentioned that the combination of budgetary restraints 
and international shipping development may challenge the Icelandic preparedness system. In 
Greenland, there is an enormous sea and coastal area of emergency preparedness 
responsibility and dispersed infrastructure. The main risk factor there is challenging underwater 
skerries, which make navigation difficult even for well-equipped vessels and experienced crew, 
and the capacities for self-support of the vessels for a longer time in case of accidents. 
The increased physical accessibility of the earlier ice-covered Arctic waters may increase the 
number of unwanted incidents because of lack of navigational support and limited experience. 
Throughout the report, the examples of the most relevant accidents are given. The table in the 
appendix illuminates both the range of risk areas and the consequences. 
These examples show that consequences of different types of accidents in the High North sea 
regions may be severe. Grounding is the most frequent type of accident by statistics and by 
activity estimates in all countries. In other regions, grounding may not represent a severe 
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incident. In the High North, both the unprotected coastlines and the time until towing and SAR-
capacities are able to arrive may increase the negative consequences. The probability of 
collisions between vessels and with ice is rather low according to statistics. Modern weather 
and ice forecasting and advanced navigation instruments contribute to a reduction of 
probability. However, major events demonstrate that in some polar waters it may be 
challenging.  Given the estimated growth of international transit shipping especially to and from 
Russian oil and gas fields, the risk of collision in icy areas may increase.  
Statistics illuminate that fire on board has a quite high probability, and at the same time 
consequences in heavy weather and far from the nearest harbor can be very dramatic. Own 
firefighting capacity on board of vessels and installation is crucial in reducing the consequences 
in this field. 
Statistics of terror and violent actions in the sea areas of the High North has a very low 
probability rate and hardly assessable consequences due to the costs of planning and 
performing such an act without being discovered.  However, the examples in the enclosed table 
shows that especially environmental activism and possible destruction action may occur, also 
with the risk of lives lost.  
As for types of vessels, the fishing fleet represents the highest probability of accidents due to 
their all-year operation in all studied sea areas. The fishing fleet also varies as to technical 
quality and size. Many vessels are also stretching their limits as to weather and wave conditions 
and distances to the nearest harbor.  
Dry cargo vessels following routs close to shore have a history of high risk of stranding with 
dramatic consequences as to both life and environment. Along the Norwegian mainland 
coastline, the frequency of grounding and fire among fishing vessels is high. Smaller motor 
boats and fishing vessels in the Greenland region are most often in distress, but they are not 
creating the largest risk either to human lives or for the environment, since these are small 
vessels. In Russian Arctic the risks of fire and collision among fishing vessels are assessed as 
rather high as well. The statistics shows high frequency and low consequences. However, 
dramatic examples with larger fishing trawlers demonstrate the challenges of SAR operations 
in remote Arctic waters. 
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The increased cruise traffic in all countries represents a new challenge as they search for 
exposed areas with larger vessels, including many elderly passengers. The probability of 
accidents is low. The Polar code will increase safety and preparedness in the cruise fleet. The 
industry is also taking measures to reduce the risks. However, the consequences of a major 
accident may be dramatic, especially related to grounding and fire on board. Evacuation at sea 
is very problematic due to limited adaptation of rescue equipment to the cold climate. In 
Norway, oil spills and life-threatening accidents with large cruise ships are the most discussed 
events due to the consequences and the preparedness capacity for mass rescue operations, 
hospital care and oil spill response to heavy oil leakages. In Greenlandic sea areas significant 
risk for human lives and the environment is also estimated for tourist and cruise ships that sail 
in remote and isolated areas. Russia also estimates that the risks for people are highest in case 
of fire or other incidents on tourist ships. 
An increased amount of shuttle oil tankers especially in the Russian Arctic represents a certain 
risk due to the limited possibility of oil recovery capacities in the remote areas. Increased 
cooperation between the coastal authorities on sea traffic surveillance and introduction of 
vessel traffic systems with fixed fairways for vessels carrying dangerous goods reduce the 
probability of accidents.  However, the oil recovery equipment and techniques available are not 
well adapted to cold and icy waters, and large amounts of heavy oil represent a significant 
challenge. 
In Iceland, new patterns of vessel traffic represent new challenges, particularly with respect to 
controlling pollution prevention and salvage operations. Government institutions may lack the 
power to take all measures considered necessary for life saving equipment investments, sailing 
routes and efforts to prevent marine pollution and assure refund of salvage operations. There 
is a continuous need for evaluation of government emergency capacity as the regional pattern 
of vessel operation changes, and this has to be an on-going process.  
The risk factors for maritime activity remain the same. Nevertheless, better vessels, safety 
equipment adapted to cold climate, improved technology, improved contingency planning, 
routines and rescue procedures, and safety and rescue skills training may contribute to better 
preparedness system. An effective cooperation between the shipping companies and the 
government institutions, and between emergency preparedness centers continuously 
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assessing risks and consequences are in demand. 
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APPENDIX OVERVIEW OF THE EXAMPLES IN THE REPORT BY INCIDENT TYPE, 
RISK FACTOR AND REASON AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
Land, place and 
date of the 
incident 
Name of the 
vessel, type of 
vessel, size 
Incident type Context Consequences 
Russia, North of 
Kanin Nos 
Peninsula, 
23.07.2010 
“Varnek”, self-
propelled pontoon 
with container 
cargo 130t 
Sinking Severe weather: 
Storm,  
9 people died. 
Loss of vessel 
Russia, Sea of 
Okhotsk, 
01.04.2015 
“Far East”, 
refrigerator fishing 
trawler, crew 132p 
Overloaded net 
and capsizing   
Low 
temperatures, 
icing, strong 
winds, rough sea, 
darkness 
69 people died. 
Loss of vessel  
Russia, off the 
coast of Sakhalin 
island, 
18.12.2011 
“Kolskaya”, jack-
up rig with crew 
67p 
Rig capsized 
while being 
towed 
Stability loss due 
to icing and rough 
weather, -17 
degrees, water 
temperature 1 
degree Celsius 
53 people died 
Russia, Usinsk, 
12.08.1994 
The “Usinsk” 
pipeline 
Pipeline leak ruptured pipeline, 
ice floes  
huge oil spill (ca. 
102,000 barrels) 
Russia, Sakhalin 
shelf, 2009 
“Molikpak” 
platform, 90000 
barrels per day. 
System failure  ice near the rig 165 l oil spill  
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Russia, 
Prirazlomnaya 
offshore 
platform, 
18.09.2013 
“Prirazlomnaya” 
offshore platform, 
activists sailed 
from the “Arctic 
Sunrise” using 
inflatable boats 
Environment 
activism 
Greenpeace  
Arctic waters Commercial 
losses 
Russia, Barents 
Sea, off the coast 
Rybachiy, 
Peninsula, 
18.12.2007 
“Viktor Koryakin”, 
dry cargo vessel, 
with crew 12p and 
timber cargo 
Grounding/Anch
ored by the 
coast 
gale force winds, 
no helicopters 
available, the 
nearest – Sea king 
from Banak 
(Norway)  
All rescued, no 
large oil spill 
Russia, Long 
Strait, 09.10.1983 
"Nina Sagaydak", 
MV, in caravan 
with icebreakers 
"Kamensk-
Uralskiy" and 
"Urengoy" 
Collision/ 
jammed by big, 
old drift-ice, 
three vessels 
collision  
compressed ice 
between ships in 
the caravan 
All evacuated, 
ship sank 
Russia, Kara Sea, 
september 2013 
“Nordvik”, tanker 
138m long 
Collision Ice floe, sailed 
without 
icebreaker 
assistance 
Loss of values 
 
Russia, route 
from Dudinka to 
Murmansk, 
15.12.2011 
“Vaigach”, nuclear 
icebreaker 
Fire Several explosions Loss of values 
Russia, shipyard 
in Arkhangelsk, 
February 2010 
"Alushta", 
passenger tourist 
vessel, with 30 
workers on borad 
Fire on board Hard frost 
outside, high 
combustion 
temperature 
4 delivered to 
hospital with burn 
injuries and toxic 
poisoning, the 
ship burned out 
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Russia, Laptev 
sea, 27.08.2010 
"Alexey 
Kulakovsky", tug 
boat with 14 crew  
Sinking  Sea waves 2,5 
meters, western 
wind of 20 meters 
per second, 
technical failure 
and unseaworthy 
conditions 
11 people died  
Russia, Pechora 
Sea, towards 
Murmansk, 
07.11.2014 
“Saturn”, jack-up 
rig 
Damaged in 
storm while 
being towed 
Storm, helipad 
damaged, 
handled by three 
professional 
tugboats from 
Norway 
Loss of values 
Russia, White Sea, 
08.06.2014 
“Barents-1100” 
fast boat  
Surprised by 
weather and ran 
out of fuel 
Severe storm  Crew and boat 
was saved by 
nuclear 
submarine 
“Voronezh” 
Italy, the 
Mediterranean 
Sea, Tuscany, 
13.01.212 
“Costa 
Concordia”, cruise 
ship, 4,252 people 
onboard 
Grounding / 
hitting the rock/ 
sinking 
irrational 
navigation, bad 
weather, poor 
safety culture 
onboard 
33 people died, 
loss of vessel 
Norway, Lofoten 
archipelago, 
November 2014 
“Marco Polo”, 
cruise liner M/V, 
763 passengers 
Grounding Got stuck on sand 
bank 
No vessel damage 
Delays 
Loss of values 
USA, the Gulf of 
Mexico, April 
2010 
Macondo well,  
“Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill”, 
126 crew 
members 
Fire/Explosion, 
oil spill 
Large accident, 
offshore 
deepwater, 
technical failure 
11 people died., 
Extensive damage 
to marine and 
wildlife habitats 
and fishing and 
tourism.  
Loss of rig 
Alaska, March 
1989 
“Exxon Valdez” 
disaster, oil tanker 
Grounding/ 
struck a reef 
sub-Arctic 
vulnerable waters  
42,000 m3 of 
crude oil, polluted 
shoreline 
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Norway, Svalbard 
area, 1989 
“Maxim Gorkiy”, 
cruise ship 
Collisions with 
ice floes 
Remoteness, 
night, waves 
No lives lost. 
Severe damage to 
vessel 
Norway, Svalbard 
area, July 1997 
“Hanseatic”, 
cruise ship, 26 
passengers 
Grounding  Good weather No damage 
Norway, outside 
Langesund, 
Telemark, 2009 
“Full City”, with 
1100 tons of heavy 
fuel and diesel 
Grounding Bad weather, 
gale-force wind, 
4-6 meters waves 
Oil spill of 200 
tons, appx. 2500 
sea birds lost their 
lives 
Norway, outside 
Ålesund, 2011 
“Nordlys”, coastal 
steamer MV, 262 
people onboard 
Explosion in 
engine room 
Good weather, 
close to town and 
rescue capacity 
2 people died. 
Severe vessel 
damage 
Iceland, east, 
06.09.2014 
“Samskip 
Akrafell”, cargo  
Grounding Navigation officer 
had fallen asleep, 
only 1patrol 
vessel available, 
lack of manpower 
Crew saved, 
vessel damaged 
Iceland, south of 
the Westman 
Islands, 
30.10.2013 
“Fernanda”, MV, 
RoRo ship, crew of 
11 
Fire room Crew saved 
Iceland, south 
coast, 1997 
“Vikartindur”, MV, 
container ship 
Grounding Engine failure, 
captain refused to 
receive assistance 
death of an 
Icelandic Coast 
Guard’s rescue 
man, sea pollution 
prevented, 
polluted coastline 
Iceland, 
19.12.2006 
“Wilson Muuga”, 
bulk carrier 
Grounding harsh weather 
conditions 
death of a rescue 
man from a 
nearby Danish 
patrol vessel, oil 
leak in ocean 
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Iceland, port of 
Reykjavik, 1986 
two whaling ships Violent action  Members of the 
Sea Shepherd 
environmental 
organization sank 
the ships, protest 
reasons against 
whaling  
No human 
injuries, two ships 
sank 
Iceland, 500 nm 
southwest, 
September 2014 
“Reykjafoss”, 
general cargo 
container ship 
Other Long distance, 
took 10 hours to 
transport injured 
men  
injuries 
Iceland, 
17.09.2014 
“Green Freezer”, 
cargo ship, 109 
meter long 
Grounding / 
struck onto a 
skerry 
plans to use a 
tugboat to refloat 
the vessel failed 
Oil spill prevented 
Greenland, the 
Disco Bay area, 
August 2014 
Passenger boat  Grounding Human factors, 
bad weather 
4 people died 
Greenland, Arsuk 
fjord, 2006 
Ship owned by 
Danish maritime 
Authority 
Grounding/ 
sinking 
Underwater 
skerries, 
navigation 
challenges even 
though the ship 
was equipped to 
locate underwater 
reefs 
Oil pollution 
prevented 
Greenland, west 
coast, 2010 and 
2012 
“Sarfaq Ittuk”, 
passenger vessel 
Grounding Underwater 
skerries 
No significant 
damage 
Greenland, off 
Nuuk 2012 
“Vega Sagittarius”, 
large container 
ship 
Collision with ice Icy waters No significant 
damage 
Greenland, west 
off the Disco 
island, 2011 
Offshore 
installation 
Environment 
activism 
Greenpeace-
action against 
offshore drilling 
Open sea with ice  
Calm weather 
No significant 
damage 
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